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Summary 
Over the years it has become clear that the Court of Justice of the European Union 
may, despite the principle of fiscal sovereignty rule on the compatibility of domestic 
tax measures belonging to the field of direct taxation, with the fundamental freedoms. 
Truthfully, the compatibility assessment is found much earlier in other fields of law. 1  
The last step of the methodology used by the Court encompasses a proportionality 
assessment, which could be said to form part of the justification process. It could 
however, also be viewed as an independent step in the method used by the Court. 
This master thesis concerns the question of whether the principle of proportionality is 
dependent on legal certainty. In the light of recent case law delivered by the ECJ such 
conclusion may be drawn.  
 
The principle of proportionality is portrayed as a substantive principle often expressed 
by the Court with the wording that; the measures in question must be appropriate and necessary 
to achieve its objectives.2 Apart from this there have been a discussion on whether the 
principle of proportionality entail procedural requirement as well. This is commonly 
referred to as the proceduralization. Procedural requirements have occasionally 
surfaced in the context of the compatibility assessment in EU law in general. 
However, this may also been seen in the case law of the Court concerning measures 
belonging to the field of direct taxation. In the ITELCAR-case3 following the SIAT-
case4, the Court held that the measures were not proportionate, as they did not fulfil 
the principle of legal certainty, as a procedural requirement imposed by the principle 
of proportionality. In both cases the Court made it all the way to the proportionality 
assessment before contemplating that since the rules where not sufficiently precise, 
they did not fulfil the principle of legal certainty, hence, they could, according to the 
Court not be considered proportionate. Consequently, the domestic measures in 
question were not justifiable. So is legal certainty a requirement for proportionality?  
 
The question on whether legal certainty constitutes an additional requirement for 
proportionality has been seen within other fields of law where the domestic measures 
in question have been somewhat ambiguous with regard to certain expressions and 
definitions, or whether the system laid down by the domestic measures have not been 
foreseeable. Examples are seen in inter alia the Laval-case5, concerning the Swedish 
labour legislation, the golden shares-case6 concerning a system of prior authorisation for 
acquisition of shares in a certain entity and in the Church of Scientology-case7 concerning 
a similar system of prior authorisation, both concerning French legislation.  Both the 
SIAT-case and the ITELCAR-case suggests that this development have reached the 
field of direct taxation. 
 
The questions to ask are perhaps if this construction of the principle of 
proportionality, with the procedural requirements is desirable, whether legal certainty 
as a general principle of law, really fits within the technical frame of that principle and 
what consequences that follows from such a technical construction? Nonetheless, 
legal certainty will most certainly continue to surface as a procedural requirement 
within the proportionality assessment.  
 
                                                      
1 See, inter alia, the case law concerning the free movement of goods. 
2 See inter alia, Case C-318/10 SIAT, para 49. 
3 Case C-282/12 ITELCAR. 
4 Case C-318/10 SIAT. 
5 Case C-341/05 Laval. 
6 Case C-483/99 golden shares . 
7 Case C-54/99 Church of Scientology. 
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Sammanfattning 
Varje medlemsstat har förbehållit sig rätten att lagstifta inom rättsområdet direkt 
beskattning. Det medför att medlemsstaterna är skatterättsligt suveräna och att 
gemensamma EU-beslut kan fattas inom detta rättsområde, under särskilda 
omständigheter. Trots detta har EU-domstolen sedan ca 30 år tillbaka, avkunnat 
domar som berör frågor huruvida regler inom den direkta beskattningens område är 
förenliga med den fria rörligheten.8 Möjligheten för EU-domstolen att fördöma en 
medlemsstats lagstiftning inom andra rättsområden har dock funnits betydligt längre.9 
Vid en prövning av huruvida en medlemsstats nationella lagstiftning är förenlig med 
den fria rörligheten använder sig EU-domstolen av en fler-stegs-metod. Den sista 
prövningen, som kan sägas ingå i rättfärdigandeprövningen, innefattar en 
proportionalitetsprövning. Det är själva proportionalitetsprövningen som är föremål 
för behandling i detta examensarbete. 
 
Proportionalitetsprincipen uttrycks ofta av EU-domstolen genom följande referens: 
Lagstiftningen ska inte gå utöver vad som krävs för att uppnå dess syfte.10 Denna kärna har 
tidvis kompletterats med ytterligare krav eller kriterier av processuell eller 
administrativ karaktär. Dessa krav har sporadiskt dykt upp i 
proportionalitetsprövningen, och så har även skett i mål rörande lagstiftning som 
tillhör den direkta beskattningens område. I målen SIAT11 och ITELCAR12 
uppmärksammade EU-domstolen att de ifrågasatta reglerna innehöll begrepp som inte 
hade någon uttalad definition inom respektive stats lagstiftning och praxis. EU-
domstolen konstaterade att då reglerna inte uppfyllde principen om rättssäkerhet så 
kunde de inte anses vara proportionerliga och således kunde reglerna inte rättfärdigas. 
Utgör rättssäkerhetsprincipen således ett krav inom ramen för 
proportionalitetsprövningen?  
 
Vid prövning av regler inom andra rättsområden har EU-domstolen sporadiskt lyft 
fram principen om rättssäkerhet som krav inom ramen för proportionalitetsprincipen. 
Kriteriet har främst använts i mål där den nationella lagstiftningen bygger på begrepp 
och definitioner som inte är tydliga eller där den nationella lagstiftningen har uppställt 
ett krav på beslut innan vissa handlingar har kunnat vidtas. Exempelvis kan Laval-
målet13 som berör den svenska arbetsrätten nämnas tillsammans med golden shares-
målet14 samt Church of Scientology-målet15 som båda berörde franska regler om 
auktorisering i förtid av vissa investeringar. SIAT- respektive ITELCAR-målet 
indikerar att denna utveckling har nått regler som tillhör den direkta beskattningens 
område.  
 
Frågorna som bör ställas är kanske om proportionalitetsprövningen bör konstrueras 
på detta sätt. Är det eftersträvansvärt att utöka kraven inom ramen för själva 
proportionalitetsprincipen? Finns det utrymme för principen om rättssäkerhet och 
vilka effekter får en sådan konstruktion? Oavsett bör det framhållas att principen om 
rättsäkerhet, med stor sannolikhet, kommer att utgöra ett krav inom ramen för 
proportionalitetsprövningen i framtiden.  
 
                                                      
8 Här ”the fundamental freedoms”. 
9 Se, inter alia, mål gällande den fria rörligheten för varor. 
10 Se, inter alia, Case C-318/10 SIAT, para 49. 
11 Case C-318/10 SIAT. 
12 Case C-282/12 ITELCAR. 
13 Case C-341/05 Laval.  
14 Case C-483/99 golden shares.  
15 Case C-54/99 Church of Scientology. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
It was not until 1986 that the Court of Justice of the European Union16 for the first 
time ruled in a matter relating to direct taxation. In Commission v France17 the question 
concerned the compatibility of a phenomena in French tax law commonly known as 
avoir fiscal, resembling a tax credit for entities established in France who received 
dividends from French subsidiaries. Direct taxation, distinguished from indirect 
taxation, is not a completely harmonized field of law18, thus it forms part of the fiscal 
sovereignty of each Member State.19 Despite the principle of fiscal sovereignty, the 
Court has continuously delivered preliminary rulings on the compatibility of domestic 
measures belonging to the field of direct taxation by reiterating that the competence 
[regarding the field of direct taxation] rests within the Member States, but such 
competence must nevertheless be exercised in compliance with EU law, i.e. with the 
fundamental freedoms.20 
 
The compatibility assessment of the Court follows a methodological approach and 
culminates in the justification process with the proportionality assessment, entailing 
the principle of proportionality, as the last factor to determine whether the measures 
in question are possible to justify or not. Proportionality is an old phenomena dating 
back to the ancient judicial systems. The Court often expresses the justification 
process with the following statement: 
 
”[…]a restriction on [the freedom in question] may be permissible if it is 
justified by overriding reasons in the public interest. It is further necessary, in 
such a case, that it is appropriate to ensuring the attainment of the objective at 
issue and does not go beyond what is necessary to attain it.”21 
 
More or less this phrase is seen within the Courts reasoning when the justification 
process is reached. The domestic measures must pursue an interest corresponding to 
overriding reasons in the public interest. In other words the Court must accept the 
justification ground, moreover, the domestic measures must be appropriate for the 
objective they pursue and they must not go beyond what is necessary. As shall be 
discussed further, this proportionality assessment, entailing the principle of 
proportionality, may be constructed in different ways. However, most commonly it is 
referred to as having three pillars, appropriateness, necessity and proportionality (sensu 
stricto).  
 
Within the last two years, the Court has delivered two cases within the field of direct 
taxation that, within the proportionality assessment, raise the question on whether it 
could be concluded that the principle of proportionality contains yet another pillar, 
                                                      
16 The Court with a capital C is consistently used in this thesis as a synonymy to the shortening ECJ [European Court 
of Justice] For more information on terminology see section 1.3. 
17 ECJ 28 January 1986, Case 279/83 Commission v France – Avoir Fiscal. 
18 See inter alia the VAT Directive on the matter of harmonization of indirect taxation. 
19 The fiscal sovereignty it portrayed through the competence of the Union. The Union may adopt legislation 
concerning direct taxation however the decisions have to be made unanimously, hence the Member States have a veto 
right. See to this extent also Ståhl, et al., EU Skatterätt, p 70. 
20 The Court has continuously reiterated this in its case law concerning direct taxation. See for example Case C-282/12 
ITELCAR, para 26. It has also been mentioned with regard to other fields of law where the competence of the union 
is not exclusive. See for example Case C-341/05 Laval, para 87 where the Court also makes a reference to the case C-
446/03 Marks & Spencer concerning direct taxation. 
21 Case C-18/11 Philips Electronics, para 22, my underlining. 
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namely the requirement of legal certainty.22 Other procedural requirements have been 
seen in the case law of the Court and the question concerning the role of the principle 
of legal certainty used in this context remains. If the previous premise regarding the 
argument that legal certainty constitutes a third pillar is valid and true, it could be 
concluded that a rule cannot, within the proportionality assessment, be proportionate, 
if it lacks legal certainty. This development has proceeded within other fields of EU 
law23 and the intriguing question to be asked is whether the proportionality 
assessment, when relating to national provisions of direct taxation, has changed.  
 
1.2 Purpose 
The objective of this thesis is to examine whether the principle of proportionality, 
entailed in the proportionality assessment, poses an additional requirement on 
domestic measures belonging to the field of direct taxation. The Court recently held in 
the SIAT case that; 
 
[…]legislation which does not meet the requirements of the principle of legal 
certainty cannot be considered to be proportionate to the objectives pursued.  
 
This phrase is likely to imply that there is a relationship between the principle of 
proportionality and legal certainty, and thus, the purpose of this thesis is to examine to 
what extent this relationship exists and what consequences it implicates for the role of 
the principle of proportionality. Hence, the legal questions to examine are:  
 
Has legal certainty become an additional step of assessment within the principle of proportionality 
applied with regard to the fundamental freedoms? 
 
Does the requirement of a rule to fulfil the principle of legal certainty appear in certain situations or 
may it be applied on all domestic measures relating to direct taxation? 
 
The purpose is not only to provide the reader with a stringent definition of the 
principle of proportionality, but also to dissect the methodology of the Court. The aim 
of this is to provide a deeper knowledge on the application of the principle of 
proportionality within the field of direct taxation, and thus to answer the question 
whether or not the proportionality assessment in case law relating to direct taxation is 
moving in the same direction as the assessment within other fields of law.  
 
For the purpose of answering the legal questions posed above, additional questions 
will be dealt with along the way. Additional questions answered are, inter alia, what the 
proportionality assessment entails and how the principle of proportionality, as a 
general principle of EU law, has been influenced by the legal orders of the Member 
States and secondly, how legal certainty may be explained and what it requires in order 
to be fulfilled. Initially, questions related to the methodology of the Court will be 
discussed as an introduction to the legal matter in question. When the legal questions 
are approached, focus will be held on the last step in the methodology of the Court, 
namely the proportionality assessment.  
 
Finally, the importance of this subject and purpose must be emphasised. Legal 
certainty is a general requirement highly affiliated with the rule of law and so it is 
expected that domestic measures forming part of the national legal systems fulfil this 
requirement. However, by making proportionality dependent on legal certainty we 
                                                      
22 See with reference to direct taxation, Case C-282/12 ITELCAR, Case C-318/10 SIAT. 
23 See the case law mentioned in section 5.2 and 5.3.1. 
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increase the effect of the principle of proportionality as a tool used by the ECJ as well 
as by the national courts. By making proportionality dependent on legal certainty it 
may be concluded that rules may not be justified if they do not fulfil the principle of 
legal certainty. By contesting this approach and concluding that the principle of 
proportionality is not dependent on legal certainty it may be concluded that rules that 
do not fulfil such principle may be justified, hence, they can be compatible with the 
fundamental freedoms although not fulfilling the principle of legal certainty. In 
practice this could have had an effect on the outcome in the SIAT and the 
ITELCAR-case.   
 
 
1.3 Method, Material and Terminology 
Method 
 
In order to answer the legal questions posed I use a method where firstly, the legal 
framework is presented as it stands today with a retrospective analysis. The first 
section therefore consist of a presentation of the Court’s different methods of 
interpretation and the methodology used by the Court when assessing the 
compatibility of domestic measures with the fundamental freedoms. The legal 
framework is presented from a technical point of view, which is based on the case law 
of the Court and therefore allows for a more historical perspective in this section. My 
intentions was to provide the reader with an brief introduction but as the thesis grew 
it became obvious to me that there were plenty of interesting things to point out in 
this section in order to fully understand the relationship between the fundamental 
freedoms and direct taxation. Despite my intentions I believe that this is in no way 
inaccurate for the following pat of this thesis. 
 
Secondly, the notion of the general principles of EU law is discussed in the context 
where it is viewed as part of the legal framework.  
 
Thirdly, the recent developments seen in the case law of the Court is discussed with 
references to both case law and doctrinal debate. This chapter does not form part of 
the legal framework as it is discussed in this thesis as a possible new approach to the 
legal framework presented in the previous chapters.   
 
Finally, the analysis forms part of the third and last section of this thesis. Throughout 
the thesis an ongoing analysis is made in order to keep the conclusions in close 
memory. The overall conclusions are however presented in the final chapter. 
 
This method is inspired by the idea to first address the issue, secondly the relevant 
rules, following presenting the analysis of the outcome after the rules have been 
applied on the issue and finally the conclusion. In this regard it should, in my opinion 
resemble the method used by the Court of Justice of the European Union when 
addressing legal questions, hence it should reflect the approach used by the Court 
when reasoning in its judgments.24 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
24 Perhaps the most relevant source in this regard is to refer to the case law of the Court. Therefore, I suggest that 
chapter 3 is revised in order to grasp the idea surrounding this methodology presented.  
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Material 
 
To answer the legal questions posed de lege lata is firstly considered. The sources of law 
of the European Union consist of primary and secondary law. The Lisbon Treaty 
forms part of the primary law along with the general principles of law.25 The hierarchy 
of the norms is, in itself a disputed matter, especially the role of the unwritten general 
principles of EU law. They are however considered as forming part of the primary law 
of the European Union in this section.26  
 
Secondary EU law refers to various legislative acts issues by the European Union 
institutions by exercising their powers.27 Lastly, case law of the Court is used as the 
primary source of this thesis. It is by way of negative integration that the case law of 
the Court becomes legally binding.28 It should be emphasised already in this section, 
that negative integration is a method that integrates the European legal orders through 
the case law rather than through adoption of legislative decisions. As a comparison, 
positive integration can be mentioned and explained with reference to the VAT 
Directive, which is the result of a number of the decisions taken by the relevant 
institution of the European Union. When referring to direct taxation and the abolition 
of obstacles in the different domestic legislations it is more accurate to refer to 
coordination, rather than a harmonization.29  
 
The case law of the Court prevails over the Member States’ legislation due to the 
principle of primacy of EU law. The role of the European Court of Justice is to 
interpret European Union law and the case law is therefore a vital source, which 
allows for the Union law to constantly evolve.  
 
 
Case law selection 
 
Due to the fact that the Court has been assessing national provisions relating to direct 
taxation since 1986, so the case law is rapidly increasing, all the case law has therefore 
unfortunately not been thoroughly reviewed in this thesis. However, the ground 
breaking cases which have lead to a development of Union law have been studied. 
The methodology of the Court has been described with references to case law relating 
to direct taxation in general, although occasionally case law relating to indirect 
taxation, as well as other fields of law has been mentioned when they have been 
considered as great value and as brining something to the dissertation on the 
methodology. 
 
The case law concerning the principle of proportionality and legal certainty has been 
chosen on the basis of their characteristics. The cases discussed in these sections have 
either a great value or either it supports the argument I wish to put forth. The case law 
selection concerning these chapters is therefore not limited to the field of direct 
taxation.  
 
In section 6.2 case law delivered between the SIAT and the ITELCAR judgements 
are discussed. The selection made in the case law has been made with reference to the 
case law concerning direct taxation with a focus on corporate taxation. Hence, case 
law related to individual taxation has been excluded. One of the main reasons for this 
is that most case law has concerned measures belonging to the corporate sector. 
                                                      
25 Rosas & Armati, EU Constitutional Law: an introduction, p 2ff. 
26 Reichel in Korling & Zamboni, Juridisk Metodlära, p 126. 
27 Borchardt, The ABC of European Union Law, p 80ff. 
28 Helminen, EU Tax Law – Direct Taxation – 2012, p 5, Reichel in Korling & Zamboni, p 119. 
29 Helminen, p 5. 
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Consequently this paper focuses on case law discussing corporate taxation, it does not 
however, focus on proportionality in reference to a certain type of domestic measures, 
as for example anti-abuse and anti-avoidance measures. The conclusions are instead to 
be perceived in a general EU Law context with the (only) main focus on measures 
relating to direct taxation, with a focus on direct corporate taxation.   
 
 
Other material 
 
Besides the case law of the Court, doctrinal literature and articles have been consulted. 
Much of the literature can be referred to as the old classics, nevertheless, they are still 
accurate and have therefore been consulted. The collection of authors consists, inter 
alia, of; Craig and de Burca, Barnard and Tridimas. Additional literature, which more 
precisely focuses on the field of direct taxation in an international context, is for 
example Englmair, Helminen, Hilling, Lang, Moëll and Peturssen. In addition to this 
literature, articles on the matter have also been scrutinised in order to discover 
different opinions on the questions of proportionality and legal certainty within 
academic circles.  
 
Terminology 
 
The shortening ECJ or the Court with a capital C refers to the European Court of 
Justice, thus whenever the term the court is used it refers to the national referring court 
in question. Mostly the Court, will be the abbreviation used in the following.  
 
The term assessment is commonly used in the literature as a reference to the 
methodology of the Court, or indeed the entire process. I have chosen to use this 
term both in the context of assessing domestic measures, but also in the context of the 
proportionality assessment within the justification process. The proportionality test is a commonly 
used phrase in the context of what the principle of proportionality contains, but it is 
also utilised when discussing the content of the proportionality assessment. 
Occasionally it can be rather confusing to speak about the proportionality assessment, 
the proportionality test and the principle of proportionality. They are however, all 
connected, and perhaps this, already, shows the flexibility that proportionality holds.  
 
The fundamental freedoms have traditionally been called the four freedoms although 
there are arguably, more than four. In the light of recent research where the Charter 
has been given plenty of spotlight is has been suggested that the fundamental 
freedoms are no longer to be referred to as the fundamental freedoms but rather as 
economic freedoms.30 The debate is interesting, however, this thesis will place emphasis on 
the question of categorization and terminology and therefore the following freedoms 
are referred to the fundamental freedoms, although they might in the future, not be 
referred to fundamental as such. I have chosen, to depart from the categorisation used 
by Helminen31 where the four freedoms still may be referred to as such, but to alter the 
categorisation slightly, as this thesis does not deal with questions concerning the free 
movement of citizens in article 21 TFEU. My division is therefore the following; and 
since there are still four fundamental freedoms I have chosen to only speak in terms 
of the fundamental freedoms when referring to the following: 
 
 
                                                      
30 Rosas & Armati, p 181. 
31 See Helminen, p 22 where she distinguishes the four freedoms as; free movement of goods, free movement of 
persons including, the free movement of citizens, free movement of works, freedom of establishment, the freedom to 
provide and receive services and finally the free movement of capital and payments.  
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- Free movement of goods article 28 TFEU 
- Free movement of workers article 45 TFEU 
- Freedom of establishment article 49 TFEU 
- Free movement of services32 article 56 TFEU 
- Free movement of capital and payments article 63 TFEU 
 
 
I have tried to find an appropriate term when the legislation of the Member States is 
discussed. It is however obvious that there are plentyful of eligible terms for referring 
to the legislation of the Member States. Terminology used in previous research are 
plenty, so in the parts where the questioned legislation of the Member States is 
discussed I will refer to them as domestic measures and not, as is sometimes seen, 
national measures. Sometimes domestic measures have been substituted by domestic 
provisions, they are in this thesis therefore to regard as tantamount. The legislation of 
the Member States is of course a national matter for the Member States. However, as 
this thesis is the outcome of my Master of Laws and my Master of Tax Law, I intend 
to view the issues discussed from an EU law perspective and hence, the Member 
States’ legislation is indeed domestic in my opinion. It might be argued that even the 
EU legislation is, with such a perspective, to be referred to as domestic, however, I 
shall not further discuss that matter, I solely wish to explain my train of thoughts in 
choosing this term when discussing measures belonging to the different Member 
States.   
 
As we will see there has been plenty of debate regarding the need for an objectively 
comparable situation. The discussion emanates from the Court’s way of using the terms 
discrimination and restriction. This will be briefly discussed in this thesis when the 
methodology of the Court is discussed. Reference will be made to the term obstacle as a 
neutral term referring to both discrimination and restriction and wherever the two terms 
are used per se it is by intention.  
 
1.4 Previous Research 
Plenty of research has been devoted to collect the scattered pieces of the early 
attempts to constitutionalise the European Union. As this thesis concerns the 
developments within the assessment of the compatibility of measures relating to direct 
taxation, the research regarding the concept of constitutionalising the European 
Union, might not at first glance be perceived as a research of interest for this thesis. It 
is however, increasingly interesting to refer to such research here as it is closely linked 
to the research concerning the role of the fundamental freedoms and the increasing 
importance of human rights.  
 
Recent research with regard to the fundamental freedoms has primarily been focused 
on the status of fundamental rights and freedoms in relation to human rights, as is 
found for example in the ECHR and the Charter.33 Questions regarding effective 
remedies have also been broadly debated within the field of direct taxation in the light 
of the fundamental freedoms and proportionality as a tool for the integration or the 
disintegration of the Union, which is a constant question of research.  
                                                      
32 It is settled case law that the free movement of services confers rights not only to the provider of services but also 
on the recipient. It is thus more correctly to speak about free movement of services rather than the freedom to provide 
services. See case law Case C-294/97 Eurowings Luftverkehr, para 34, C-290/04 FKP Scorpio Konzertproduktionen, para 32, 
C-233/09 Dijman and Dijkman-Lavaleije, para 24, C-318/10 SIAT, para 19. 
33 See to this extent Szudoczky, The sources of EU law and their relationships: Lessons for the field of taxation – Primary law, 
secondary law, fundamental freedoms and State aid rules and Petursson, The Proportionality Principle as a Tool for Disintegration in 
EU Law – of Balancing and Coherence in the Light of the Fundamental Freedoms. 
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The issues surrounding the proportionality assessment and its possible procedural 
developments have been addressed in previous research. There are however legal 
questions remaining in this field since not much is written regarding the principle of 
legal certainty as an additional requirement with regard to direct taxation.  With that 
being said, a few articles on the matter of legal certainty and rules concerning 
combating abusive practices and avoidance of taxation exist.34 However, from a 
general perspective concerning direct taxation, little has been written, hence, the 
importance to address the concerns in this thesis.  
 
 
1.5 Delimitations 
Material delimitations  
 
The free movement of goods is referred to on plenty of occasions, as will be seen later 
on. Initially, my intention was to leave this freedom outside the scope of this thesis, 
however it has been proven to me that such a delimitation was not possible to make. 
Even though the free movement of goods have deliberately been left outside the 
scope of this thesis, the older case law of the Court concerns that freedom hence, in 
some way the free movement of good has a small role in this thesis despite this 
delimitation. Free movement of goods is further an interesting field of law relating to 
business law and in many ways to indirect taxation and questions regarding excises 
duties and the WTO.   
 
There is an interesting question regarding the view of the fundamental freedoms and 
what hierarchy and what level of protection they possess in terms of fundamental 
rights. This intriguing question is not to be developed in this thesis however, as of 
now, post acceptance of the Charter of Fundamental Rights I believe it is a highly 
adequate and intriguing issue.  
 
Perhaps it is needless to say that this thesis is limited to discussing the proportionality 
assessment when domestic measures belonging to the field of direct taxation, are in 
question. 
 
This master thesis is a part of my studies of law, hence the matter is not to be 
influenced by any political statements or values. The matter is simply, or maybe the 
word complicated is more suitable, to study EU law and its development in the 
chosen field during these last could of years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
34 See inter alia, Zalansinski, Proportionality of Anti-Avoidance and Anti-Abuse Measures in the ECJ’s Direct Tax Case Law, p 
310-321 and Hilling, Justifications and Proportionality: An Analysis of the ECJ’s Assessment of National Rules for the Prevention of 
Tax Avoidance, p 294-307. 
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1.6 Outline 
This thesis contains three sections that have been presented previously in section 1.3 
under “Method”. The outline, of course follows this method but it is more precise. 
Chapter two concerns the normative framework and therefore presents the 
fundamental freedoms. This chapter addresses both the methods of interpretations 
used by the Court and the development of the methodology used by the Court when 
assessing the compatibility of domestic measures with the fundamental freedoms. 
Before the second chapter is commenced, a summary of the previous chapter is 
presented along with some conclusions.  
 
Chapter three also belongs to the normative framework and discussed the notion of 
general principles of EU law. Following this are two chapters concerning the principle 
of proportionality and legal certainty both from the perspective of general principles 
of EU law. In the chapter regarding the principle of proportionality a more extensive 
description on the proportionality assessment is also discussed.  
 
The sixth chapter is the possible ground for the de lege ferenda arguments made in the 
analysis. This chapter therefore concerns the recent case law of the Court and the 
possible additional requirement within the proportionality assessment.  
 
The thesis is then completed with the final analysis and conclusions in chapter seven. 
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2 The Fundamental Freedoms 
2.1 Introduction 
The fundaments of the articles governing the fundamental freedoms can be traced all 
the way back to the Treaty of Rome, signed in 1957 and adopted in 1958. The Treaty 
of Rome established the aim of creating a common market and the fundamental 
freedoms provisions would allow the implementation of that objective. The 
fundamental freedoms were then referred to as the four freedoms and even though 
the articles themselves have existed for over 50 years, their scope of application has 
dramatically changed over the years by way of the Courts case law.35   
 
This chapter serves as a brief introduction to the law governing the principle of free 
movement within the European Union as well as the methodology used by the Court 
when assessing the compatibility of domestic tax measures with that principle as 
expressed through the fundamental freedom provisions. However, firstly the methods 
of interpretation used by the Court are briefly presented.  
 
 
2.2 The Methods of Interpretation Used by 
the Court  
When the courts within the different Member States find themselves in a situation 
where they do not know the exact content of the Union law and how its should be 
interpreted, they may ask for preliminary ruling from the ECJ, in order to be able to 
apply and interpret the Union law as it is intended. In certain situations the courts may 
not have the possibility to choose, instead they may be obliged to ask for guidance 
from the Court. This system assures that the Union actions or measures are 
interpreted likewise by the different Member States and it assures a uniform 
interpretation of EU law. This is especially the case where the Union governs the 
competence to legislate. The Court has the authority, or the competence to deliver a 
preliminary ruling on the interpretation of the articles governed by the Treaty of 
Lisbon and legal documents enacted and adopted by the Union institutions.36 The 
competence to review the lawfulness of Union measures is governed by article 263 TFEU 
and allows the Court to review measures taken by other Union institutions. 
 
When the Court is asked to rule on the interpretation of the Union law there are 
plentiful of different methods of interpretation it may resort to. In this regard it shall 
be noted that one of these cannot be distinguished as the sole method of 
interpretation used by the Court, but commenting on the different methods here 
might perhaps shed some light on how the Court reaches the result in its judgments.37  
 
Literal interpretation is conducted by searching for “the scope of the wordings and 
giving it a meaning based on a literal and logical interpretation”.38 This is rather tricky 
as there are several different languages accepted in the Union and so the literal 
                                                      
35 Borchardt, p 12f. 
36 Article 267 TFEU. 
37 Ståhl et al., p 39-40. 
38 Joined Cases C-267/91 and C-268/91 Keck, see also Ståhl et al., p 41. 
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interpretation might force the Court to review different language versions of the same 
measures. This is perhaps more likely to be seen in the field of indirect taxation and in 
relation to the VAT Directive.39 On the other hand contextual interpretation is 
performed when the literal interpretation may not give full precise guidance.40 The 
historical interpretation refers to a method of interpretation where historical 
documents give objective and meaning to the legal acts. This is for example the 
situation when the preparatory documents are consulted to distinguish the meaning of 
the diffuse legislation in question. A parallel can be drawn with the Swedish legal 
system where the preparatory work is often considered a valuable source of law. The 
Court on the other hand is rather reluctant to review the preparatory work and is 
more likely to find the objectives of the law in the preambles etc. In this sense the 
Court does not search for the political intention behind the law but rather the 
objective one.41 Finally, the teleological method of interpretation, perhaps the most 
commonly used by the Court, is a method where the purpose and the objective are 
given much importance. The legal act is then interpreted in the light of its aim, 
purpose and objective.42 
 
 
2.3 Assessing Domestic Measures - The 
Methodology Used by the Court 
There are common denominators between the methodology used by the Court when 
assessing the compatibility of domestic measures in general and when it assesses 
domestic measures belonging to the field of direct taxation. The actual methodology 
used by the Court is not set out in the Treaty itself. Apart from depending on the field 
of law in question, to some extent at least, the technique used has evolved over time 
and may be described in a three-step-analysis as follows: 
 
1. What freedom is applicable?  
2. Does the measure in question constitute an obstacle43 to that freedom? 
3. If so, can the measure be justified? 
 
Occasionally a fourth step is mentioned independently, that being that the measure in 
question must be proportionate in a sensu stricto way. It could however be argued that 
the justification process mentioned as a third step governs the proportionality 
assessment. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
39 See, inter alia, Case 283/81 CILFIT.  
40 See, inter alia, Case 6/60 Humblet v Belgium. 
41 Ståhl et al., p 46. 
42 Ståhl et al., p 47-48 and Korling & Zamboni, p 122ff. 
43 The term obstacle is used as a broad term capturing both discrimination and restriction. See sections below for the 
discussion on discrimination/restriction.  
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2.3.1 Applicable Freedom and Economic 
Activity 
Before the question of an applicable freedom arises, it needs to be established that an 
activity has been performed in order to fall into the material scope of application of 
the fundamental freedoms. However, it is often assessed at the same point and not 
exclusively separated. In order to determine what freedom is applicable the Court will, 
on a preliminary point, regard the objective of the freedom in question, the objective 
that it pursues corresponds with the freedom in question. Nevertheless there are 
situation where there is an overlap in the scope of application between two freedoms. 
This is for example the case with regard to the free movement of capital and the 
freedom of establishment. Arguably, the free movement of capital could be 
encapsulated within the freedom of establishment, as well as the free movement of 
services could have a scope of application overlapping with the freedom of 
establishment.44 For that reason, the objective of the fundamental freedom in question 
may not always give enough guidance on which freedom is applicable in the current 
situation. More often it is relevant to consult the objectives behind the domestic 
measures in question in order to determine the applicable freedom.45 Occasionally, 
even the factual circumstances of the case need to be consulted for a correct 
distinction.46 The case law regarding what to consult in order to determine the 
applicable freedom can therefore be said not to be as precise and clear as is wished 
for. The case law regarding the importance of determining the applicable freedom has 
been somewhat ambiguous.47 From a broader perspective the question of applicable 
freedom has been of greater importance as the freedoms have been referred to as 
being mutually exclusive.48 For example, A.G. Léger held in the Gebhard case that:  
 
“The conditions imposed on establishment in the Member State in which the 
activity is carried out are, of course, much stricter than those imposed on the 
mere provision of services.”49 and “[…]-, the distinction between the provision 
of services and establishment is genuinely important.”50 
 
However, not implying that the following steps are any different. The question was 
recently placed on its tipping point in the case Fidium Finanz, which, however, did not 
concern domestic tax measures.51 Following the Fidium Finanz case, the Court has now 
dealt with the question of priority within the fundamental freedoms in relation to third 
territories. Perhaps it is safe to say, in the light of that case law, that there is no order 
of priority and the distinction between the freedoms is, less relevant than before 
notwithstanding their mutual exclusivity.52 
                                                      
44 See for example the Case C-55/94 Gebhard and Case C-452/04 Fidium Finanz regarding the method for other fields 
of law but direct taxation and see for an example referring to domestic tax measures.  
45 See inter alia, Case C-251/98 Baars and Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, Case C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome, where the 
Court made references to the aim of the domestic provisions in order to conclude the applicable freedom. 
46 See for example when the domestic measures in question are neutral on their application, in reference to whether the 
free movement of capital or the freedom of establishment shall be applicable.  
47 See for example in the field of direct taxation; Case C-204/90 Bachmann, Case C-302/97 Konle and for further reading 
Helminen, p 42. 
48 Case C-55/94 Gebhard, para 21. 
49 Case C-55/94 Gebhard, para 24. 
50 Case C-55/94 Gebhard, para 29. 
51 See for example the case law concerning the question of priority, which has now been slightly overruled by Case C-
35/11 FII (2).  
52 The Fidium Finanz case concerned German provisions that had a hindering effect on services provided by 
establishments in third territories. The circumstances of the case were that the corporation in question was established in 
Switzerland and performed banking services to customers mostly established in Germany. The German legislation in 
question forced the Swiss undertaking to possess an authorization to be able to provide its credit services to 
consumers on the German market. Fidium Finanz supported their claim on the free movement of capital. The German 
court however was unsure whether it was the free movement of capital or the freedom to provide services that was 
applicable on the domestic provisions in question. The Court came to the conclusion that the applicability must be 
determined with reference to the objective of the domestic measures in question, and that it is necessary to determine 
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The need for an activity to have taken place is however, crucial in order to fit into the 
scope of application of the fundamental freedoms, and the Court has held that such 
activity must be of an economic nature.53 This is however, not the case when domestic 
measures are being assessed in the light of article 18 TFEU; no economic nexus is 
then required.54 The demand for the existence of an economic activity explains why 
there are academic professionals advocating for another terminology to be used, 
namely, that the fundamental freedoms instead are referred to as economic free 
movement rights.55  
 
 
2.3.2 Cross Border Feature  
 
The activity performed must have a cross-border feature, as EU law does not apply to 
what is commonly referred to in the literature and the case law as wholly internal 
situations. The cross-border element ensures that the Court stays within its competence 
according to the principle of conferral, hence, that it does not assess domestic 
measures only applicable to wholly internal situations.56  
 
With this in mind, the Court may still assess the compatibility of measures, which have 
a hindering effect in the home state. An example would be where the domestic 
measures in question impose negative consequences when, inter alia, a corporation is 
to change its seat. Circumstances like this one might lead to the conclusion that the 
domestic measures in that state constitute an obstacle to the freedom of 
establishment, because the complainant in question has been hindered in making use 
of one of the fundamental freedoms. Those situations are commonly referred to as 
home-state obstacles. Although not having, per se, exercised any cross-border activity 
there has been an intention to do so. The opposite to the homes-state obstacle is the 
host-state obstacle, where contrary to the previous example, the object has made use 
of its freedoms and is therefore subject to a less advantageous regime in the host-state 
than that of a resident of the host-state.57 This brings us to the issue of finding the 
proper objectively comparable situation and whether it is even required or not.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                         
the applicable fundamental freedom in cases like this one. In following case law the Court has also relied on the factual 
circumstances for determining the applicable freedom, especially in when the question concerns the free movement of 
capital and the freedom of establishment. Confusingly the Court was to rely on the factual circumstances in certain 
cases, and even the two together in other cases. The scope of application and the question of priority culminated in the 
FII(2) case, as mentioned above. The Court concluded that establishments in third territories, which receives dividends 
from an entity in within the geographical scope of the Union, can, irrespective of whether the domestic measures falls 
into the scope of application of the freedom of establishment or the free movement of capital argue their case on the 
basis of the latter. In more precise words, the freedom of establishment would not be applicable in such a case. 
Stipulating that the factual circumstances are determinative in a situation as such. See also Ståhl et al., p 137-140 and p 
145-146, for the discussion on order of priority between free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment, 
see also Case C-35/11 FII(2) and Dahlberg, Internationell Beskattning, p 395-403.  
53 See for example Case 36/74 Walrave on the question of whether sports were activity of such nature, or Case C-
159/90 Grogan on the question of abortion in relation to the free movement of services.  
54 Helminen, p 19. 
55 Rosas & Armati, p 181. 
56 See for example Hilling, 2013, p 295 and Helminen, p 19ff. 
57 It is in this regard debatable what is the perfect benchmark. See to this extent the next section and the sources cited 
therein.  
 18 
2.3.3 Obstacle and Objectively Comparable 
Situation  
 
After concluding that a cross-border element is present with regard to the relevant 
domestic measure and in the circumstances of the case, the Court will turn to the 
question of whether the domestic measures constitutes an obstacle58 against the 
relevant freedom. The presence of an obstacle can be found with reference to two 
different approaches, either by the restrictions-approach or the discriminations-
approach including both covert and overt discrimination.59  
 
Discrimination is a concept which emanates from the principle of equality and may be 
described by the following statement60: 
 
Discrimination arises through the application of different rules to the similar 
situations or through the application of the same rules being applied to 
different situations.61   
 
Consequently, in order to conclude the existence of discrimination the Court needs to 
search for the proper comparable situation, hence it needs to perform a comparability 
analysis. Only then, when the objectively comparable situation is confirmed, can the 
premise of discrimination, mentioned above, be true.  
 
With reference to the comparability analysis it shall be stressed that nationality is often 
the distinguishing factor regarding direct discrimination, whereas, as is often used 
within domestic tax provisions, residency is the distinguishing factor for indirect 
discrimination.62 However, residency is sometimes an accepted ground for distinctions 
with reference to the tax system in question and a resident and a non-resident are 
arguably not, per se in a comparable situation.63 Other factors may however, make the 
situations in question more comparable, and so the question of the comparable 
situation is not possible to answer in a straightforward manner.64  
 
On the other hand, when a domestic measure is referred to as a restriction the Court 
tends to refer to a situation where the measure in question, renders cross-border 
engagement less attractive, or likely to impair the cross-border activity.65 This implies that 
no objectively comparable situation is necessary in such case.66  However, a measure 
cannot be characterized as restrictive if it is not put compared to another measure or, 
as in the case of the Court, between two situations. Consequently, two situations must 
                                                      
58 Here we shall remember that the term obstacle is used to refer to both discriminatory as well as restrictive measures, 
however the term itself has been part of the dispute regarding whether to use the restrictions approach or the 
discriminations approach. 
59 For the developments regarding direct and indirect discrimination in the field of direct taxation see Case 152/73 
Sotgiu, para 11 then cited in Case C-175/88 Biehl, para 13. See also Case C-76/90 Säger, Case C-415/93 Bosman. 
60 See inter alia Påhlsson, Constructing Comparability: The Reasoning of the ECJ on Equality in Taxation p 221f. 
61 See inter alia Helminen, p 20, Påhlsson, p 221f with reference to the Treaty provisions governing the principle of 
equality.  
62 See Case 152/73 Sotgiu. 
63 Helminen, p 21, and the Schumacker doctrine in Case C-279/93 Schumacker, see also Barnard, The Substantive Law of 
the EU: the Four Freedoms, p 286-287. 
64 With regard to free movement of workers see Helminen, p 26ff and to freedom of establishment Helminen, p 30ff 
as an example of situations where residents and non-residents may be in objectively comparable situations due to 
objective factors and not on the residency as a distinguishing factor. 
65 See E. Englmair, Lang et al., p 56 for the debate concerning tax law especially. See for example Case C-341/05 Laval, 
Case C-55/94 Gebhard, para 37 for an explicit restriction based approach. 
66 For the debate see for example Vanessa E. Englmair, in Lang et al. p 56f and Hohenwarter, in Lang et al., p 99ff, see 
also Barnard, p 597f for further discussion on the matter of whether it is more accurate to speak about a restriction 
based approached instead of a discrimination approach, in the light of recent case law such as: Case C-446/04 FII 
Group Litigation and Case C-374/04 ACT Group Litigation, see also Dahlberg, p 341-344 and, p 348-349 and p 352. 
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perhaps not be comparable to every extent, according to the reasoning of the Court at 
least, but perhaps may still be akin to each other.67 It is possible that one could argue 
that the fundamental freedoms should instead be referred to as fundamental rights68, 
which is also the heading of the chapter governing the freedom of establishment and 
the free movement of workers in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union.69 Notwithstanding the final word of that discussion and presuming that they 
may be referred to as rights, they are nonetheless not absolute rights, which imply that 
it is possible to derogate from the freedoms under certain circumstances.  
 
 
2.3.4 The Justification Process 
The methodology of this section resembles the line of reasoning made by the Court in 
its judgments. At first we shall briefly regard the derogations states in the Treaty. 
Secondly, the mandatory requirements as a phenomenon shall be discussed with 
relation to the different justification grounds and in this regard it is also worth 
mentioning the rule of reason doctrine. Following, this, the Gebhard case shall be 
consulted, after which the last section touches upon the content of the proportionality 
assessment within the justification process, as it stands today.  
 
 
2.3.4.1 Derogations Within the Treaty  
 
When the Court comes to the conclusion that a Member State’s domestic measure 
constitutes an obstacle70 to the fundamental freedoms and is thus not compatible with 
the Treaty, the measures may nonetheless be justified and therefore declared 
compatible with the fundamental freedoms. The possibility to derogate from the 
fundamental freedoms is governed by various articles in the TFEU. Article 36 TFEU 
concerns the possibility to derogate from the free movement of goods, assumingly 
inspired by article XX in GATT71.72 Article 52 TFEU governs the possibility to 
derogate from the freedom of establishment including the free movement of workers. 
Art 52 TFEU also applies to the free movement of services found in chapter 3 of the 
TFEU, and finally article 65 TFEU regarding the free movement of capital. These 
articles ensure that the Member States may adopt legislation which is contrary to the 
aforementioned freedoms, if grounds provided for by the relevant articles justify it.73 
The common denominator for all of these derogations is that the measures in 
question should have objectives, qualifying as fundamental to the Member States such 
as; public policy, public security and public health.  
 
Barnard expresses that, in the light of the recent development of research topics, 
maybe it is more accurate to discuss derogations based on the interests of individuals 
rather than of the Member States. Although this should be seen in the light of the free 
                                                      
67 See some interesting case law on the matter Case C-293/06 Deutsche Shell and pending Case C-686/13, concerning, 
somewhat simplified capital losses due to exchange rates. No comparable situation could be found in such situation in 
the Deutsche Shell case.  
68 See for further reading Szudoczky, p 140, as she argues that the fundamental freedoms shall not be referred to as 
rights as they do not seek to attain the objective that rights, sensu stricto, do. 
69 See chapter 2 in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. 
70 Here obstacle is used in sensu latiore including both discrimination and restriction. 
71 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, a multilateral agreement regulating international trade (now part of WTO). 
72 Barnard, p 39. 
73 Mark well that all grounds are not found in all articles mentioned above and are thus not to be referred to invariably, 
and that there are only the most relevant for direct tax law purposes which are mentioned here.  
 20 
movement of goods and the derogations in article 36 TFEU supposedly inspired by 
GATT as mentioned above.74  
 
Whilst the derogations explicitly provided by the Treaty may justify measures which 
are directly discriminatory, the rule of reason doctrine was elaborated to justify 
measures that were indirectly discriminatory.75 Indirectly discriminatory measures are 
on the outset applicable without any distinction but evidentially have the equivalent 
effect of directly discriminatory measures.76  The Court has recently been reluctant to 
make a distinct separation and more often refers to the restriction based approach on 
the free movement rather than indirect or direct discrimination approach, implying 
that the rule of reason doctrine may be used in order to justify even directly 
discriminatory measures. 
 
 
2.3.4.2 Derogations Not Stated in the Treaty – the Rule 
of Reason Doctrine 
 
Apart from the expressed derogations as mentioned above, the possibility to justify a 
measure constituting an obstacle to the fundamental freedoms remains through the 
possibility of relying on the rule of reason doctrine. The rule of reason doctrine has 
provided the Member States with a possibility to justify domestic measures 
constituting obstacles to various freedoms, on grounds not foreseen in the Treaty 
articles. The rule of reason doctrine first came to light in the Cassis de Dijon77 case, a 
case regarding the free movement of goods, where the Court elaborated the rule of 
reason doctrine through referring to mandatory requirements78. Consequently, one could 
argue with reference to the Cassis de Dijon case that the Member States gained another 
path of remedy, which allows for a further disintegration within the Union. In theory 
this might be perceived as the possibility to justify domestic measures, constituting an 
obstacle to the free movement, however, in reality it depends on the attitude of the 
Court and its willingness to accept arguments advocating further justification grounds. 
In paragraph 8 of the judgment the Court made the intriguing statement, which 
turned the Cassis de Dijon case into a land-mark case. 
 
Para 8: 
“Obstacles to movement within the Community resulting from disparities 
between the national laws relating to the marketing of the product in question 
must be accepted in so far as those provisions may be recognized as being 
necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements relating in particular to 
the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness 
of commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer.”79 
 
 
The Court emphasised that disparities between the legislation in different Member 
States must be accepted when the legislation in question is necessary to satisfy 
                                                      
74 Barnard, p 149 see also Petursson, p 70 for a cross-reference. 
75 Case C-55/94 Gebhard. 
76 See inter alia, Barnard, p 247, p 278-290 Even though the discussion is made within the context of the free 
movement of workers it is still generally relevant. See also the Gebhard case and the four criteria that can be deduced 
from that judgment. It supports the idea that the rule of reason doctrine may only be used in order to justify indirectly 
discriminatory measures. With that being said the Court has in recent years made less distinction on this matter is less 
reluctant to apply the rule of reason doctrine with regard to all obstacles. See following sections for references to the 
Gebhard case and the discussion on the applicability of the rule of reason doctrine.  
77 Case 120/78 Rewe-Zentral v Bundesmonopolverwaltung fuer branntwein, commonly referred to [Cassis de Dijon]. 
78 Sometimes the rule of reason doctrine is referred to as ”imperative requirements” or ”overriding reasons in the 
public interest”. 
79 Case 120/78 Cassis de Dijon, para 8. 
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mandatory requirements. The mandatory requirement is the foundation for which the 
grounds for justification elaborated by the case law are built upon. The Court clearly 
states a few examples of such mandatory requirements in the abovementioned 
paragraph, when it for example refers to the effectiveness of fiscal supervision. The Court has 
throughout the years following this judgment elaborated on the different grounds of 
justification and their scope of application.  
 
The Court has in principle, accepted the following grounds of justification when the 
question have concerned domestic measures belonging to the field of direct taxation.80 
 
- Cohesion or coherence of the tax system81 
- Territoriality82 
- Anti-abuse and anti avoidance83  
- Effectiveness of fiscal supervision84 
- Neutralization in the other state85 
- Balanced allocation of taxing rights between the Member States86 
- Promotion of national education and training87  
 
The mandatory requirements statement has evolved through the case law of the Court 
and consists of a non-exhaustive list of grounds for justification. Due to the fact that 
the grounds for justification appearing on this list are arguments, put forward by the 
Member States, which have been accepted by the Court as valid for justifying 
derogative measures, it has not always been clear what nature and scope of application 
they possess. Hence, the constant development of the Union law and the continuing 
questions on the scope of application of the existing grounds for justification as well 
as questions regarding possible new justification grounds still arise. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
80 In the mid 1990s it may be understood by the Courts case law that the rule of reason doctrine was only applicable on 
measures which where indistinctly discriminatory, in other words, to measures constituting indirect discrimination. See 
for example Case C-311/97 Royal Bank of Scotland. This was however, overruled in the following case law and the rule 
of reason doctrines is not restricted only to act as a justification process for indirect discrimination, but also for 
indirectly discriminatory measures, and arguably also for ”solely” restrictive measures as such. See for example 
Dahlberg, 350-353. 
81 Used for example in Case C-204/90 Bachmann, Case C-300/90 Commission v Belgium. It is noteworthy to mention that 
the Court have been continuously reluctant to accept this justification ground, and when it does accept it, it is based on 
the real existence of a direct link between a tax benefit and a tax burden.  
82 This ground for justification is in close connection to the cohesion or coherence of the tax system as Helminen 
explains, it is hard to argue that domestic tax provisions are justified on the ground of territoriality if the national tax 
system does not follow the territoriality principle in a consistent manner – see Helminen p 48. See also Case C-250/95 
Futura Participations SA and Singer v Administration des contributions, however the perceptions seem to be diverse in the 
academia and it is factually so that the Court has only accepted this justification ground in the Futura case, if that was 
the reason for the justification that is – see Ståhl et al. p 161-162 for this argument and also E. Englmair p 74, and 
Dahlberg, 363. 
83 See for example Case C-255/02 Halifax case, which although it concerned VAT fraud, is still a landmark case for tax 
law in general. See also Case C-196/04 Cadbury Schweppes, Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, Case C-231/05 Oy AA. 
84 An example is the Cassis de Dijon case mentioned above. 
85 See for example Case C-170/05 Denkavit, which regarded withholding tax on outbound dividends and the possibility 
to neutralize such dividends in the receiving state. This justification ground regards questions on the relationship 
between the EU Law and Double Tax Conventions between states.  
86 This justification ground was used together with the anti-avoidance justification in Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer 
even though an additional, not accepted justification ground also was opted for. The justification ground has further 
been used in, inter alia, the following cases: Case C-231/05 Oy AA, Case C-414/06 Lidl, Case C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome, 
Case C-311/08 SGI and Case C-337/08 X Holding. 
87 Inter alia Case C-10/10 Commission v Austria, although this ground of justification was accepted in this case, the 
measure in question did not comply with the proportionality assessment. 
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2.3.4.3 The Gebhard-test  
 
Stipulating that domestic measures could be justified by mandatory requirements they 
still need to fulfil the requirements, imposed by the principle of proportionality as the 
final test in the justification process.88 With a broad perspective on the methodology, 
the final step of the justification process may be described with reference to the 
Gebhard89 case which defines the criteria that domestic measures, justified by 
mandatory requirements, must fulfil in order to be fully justified. In should be stressed 
here that the Gebhard case may be referred to when presenting the justification process 
itself, as it only entails two requirements which symbolise the proportionality 
assessment. The remaining two concerns the relationship with the concept of 
mandatory requirements as have been discussed above.  
 
The circumstance in the Gebhard case were that Mr Gebhard, a German national who 
was authorized to practice as a Rechtsanwalt90 in Germany, moved to Italy with his 
family in 1978. He has since then pursued his professional activity in Italy in a set of 
chambers of lawyers practicing in association. Starting from 1989 he opened his own 
chambers were he pursued his professional activity with an Italian avvocati and 
procuratori. Complaints were lodged against Mr Gebhard and his chamber as he used 
the title avoocati in his letterhead etc. The complaints culminated in disciplinary 
proceedings after Mr Gebhard refused to follow the prohibition to use the title avocati. 
The national court in question, dealing with the disciplinary proceedings was unsure as 
how to interpret [then] Community law and so it stayed the proceedings and referred a 
question for preliminary ruling from the ECJ. It should be stressed here that the 
question did not solely concern the freedom of establishment but also Directive 
89/48/EEC of 31 December 1988 on a general system for the recognition of higher-education 
diplomas awarded on completion of professional education and training of at least three years. The 
field of law was thus slightly harmonised by that directive.91 
 
The Court concluded that while taking up and pursuing certain self-employed 
activities, one may have to comply with certain provisions laid down by that legal 
system in different ways. An example of that is where certain activities are restricted to 
holders of a diploma or similar evidence and the use of certain titles, as is the question 
is this case. In principle this means that a foreign national wishing to pursue such a 
professional activity must comply with the requirements stipulated by that legal 
system. However, the directive mentioned above clearly seeks to facilitate the 
fulfilment of such requirements by imposing on the Member States rules concerning 
mutual recognition of diplomas etc. Without clearly expressing that the measures in 
question constitute an obstacle against the freedom of establishment, the Court 
moved on to what may be described as the justification process and stipulates four 
criteria that must be fulfilled in order for the domestic measures to be justified.92 
 
1. The rules in question must be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; 
2. The rules must be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; 
3. The rules must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; 
and 
4. The rules must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.93 
 
                                                      
88 Dahlberg, p 353, see for reference to the case law for example Case C-446/03 Marks & Spencer, para 53. 
89 Case C-55/94 Gebhard. 
90 The term can be translated to lawyer, attorney, barrister, solicitor or a person of similar capacity. 
91 Case C-55/94 Gebhard, para 2-5,8, 32, 36. 
92 Case C-55/94 Gebhard, para 35-37. 
93 Case C-55/94 Gebhard, para 37 se also Barnard, p 528. 
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The Court has referred to the Gebhard case and the test in following case law 
concerning the other freedoms, which stipulates that the test is applicable on the other 
freedoms as well as with regard to the assessment of compatibility of rules belonging 
to other fields of law.94 Subsequently, the Court has referred to the four conditions 
from the Gebhard case as the Gebhard-test, when performing the justification process 
including the proportionality assessment. In this regard it shall be mentioned that the 
Court has not necessarily stated the four criteria as clearly as it did with concern to Mr 
Gebhard, sometimes the Court tends to refer to the proportionality assessment with 
reference solely to the wording of the Cassis de Dijon case.95 
 
 
2.3.4.4 Proportionality – the Last Resort 
In the Rau96 case the Court established that the domestic measures in question had to 
fulfil the principle of proportionality in order to be fully justified. This was later 
transformed in the Gebhard case, which has been previously discussed. The principle 
of proportionality had however surfaced already in the 1970s in the context of [then] 
Community law and even earlier in other contexts of Community law.97 The exact 
extent of what was intended with applying the principle of proportionality is however, 
expressed neither in the judgment the Rau case nor in the Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft case. The Gebhard case did however, provide us with a somewhat 
strategy on how to apply the principle of proportionality as the last step of assessment 
within the justification process. In the Gebhard case the Court contemplated that “the 
rules must be suitable for securing the objective which they pursue and that the rules must not go 
beyond what is necessary in order to attain that objective”.98 In essence this expression could be 
held to resemble the principle of proportionality itself, therefore it is possible to 
conclude that the principle of proportionality may constitute an independent step in 
the methodology used by the Court, it may however still form part of the justification 
process. Irrespective of the conclusion it may be stated that the principle of 
proportionality comes to expression in the assessment made by the Court. The 
remaining question is perhaps how the Court reasons with regard to whether the 
principle is fulfilled or not. This will be further discussed in chapter four.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
94 See for example Case C-367/98 Commission v Portugal, see also Barnard, who argues that the test is applicable in other 
fields of law with reference to the operative part of the judgment in para 6 of the judgment. 
95 See section 2.3.4.2. 
96 Case 261/81 Rau. 
97 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, see for example old employment cases. 
98 See previous with reference to Case C-55/94 Gebhard, para 37. 
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2.4 Summary and Conslusions 
The methods of interpretation used by the Court are initially presented in this chapter. 
The importance of those methods is seldom explicitly presented they are however, of 
great importance for understanding the methodology used by the Court and for 
understanding why the Court reaches the judgements that it does. The methods of 
interpretation are therefore significantly more important than first thought of. 
Occasionally the Court uses different methods of interpretation, but most often it 
resorts to the teleological method. This allows the Court to conclude its judgment in 
relation to the objectives of the European Union, and it is also why we see such a 
great development in the methodology used by the Court in relation to the 
fundamental freedoms. A great example is the rule of reason doctrine and as we shall 
see in detail, the Gebhard test. The different methods of interpretation therefore allow 
the Court to work with expediency.   
 
The methodology of the Court when assessing the compatibility of domestic 
measures, in general, with the fundamental freedoms can be summarized in the 
following steps. Firstly, an economic activity needs to have taken place in order for 
the fundamental freedoms to apply. This is exemplified with reference to the Grogan 
case, which concerned the right to abortion in relation to the fundamental freedoms.  
The economic nexus may be explained with reference to the objectives of the 
fundamental freedoms, since they constitute measures to achieve the implementation 
of the internal market. Secondly, the measures in question must possess a cross-
border element and it must be classified as constituting an obstacle against the 
applicable freedom. The term obstacle is, in this context, referring to either restrictive 
or discriminatory measures. The question of the need for an objectively comparable 
situation is not the focus of this thesis, however, with reference to the criteria posed in 
the Gebhard case, some comments are necessary to be made in this regard. The Court 
has not abandoned the discriminations approach and the need for an objectively 
comparable situation by introducing the restrictions approach. It has however lowered 
the bar. The restrictions approach is not a recent phenomenon; rather it goes back to 
the early case law. Further conclusions concerning the change in approach by the 
Court cannot be made here. With that being stipulated the issues surrounding this 
matter are intriguing and should be further discussed in the legal debate.  
 
When the Court concludes that the domestic measure in question constitutes an 
obstacle the Court has to assess whether the measures may, nonetheless, be justified. 
The justification process is often described with reference to the Gebhard case where 
the Court distinguished the following four criteria, which must be fulfilled in order for 
the measures to be justified.  
 
1. Be applied in a non-discriminatory manner; 
2. Be justified by imperative requirements in the general interest; 
3. Be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; and 
4. Not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it 
 
The first criterion must be read in coherence with the second criteria, and together 
they stipulate that the rule of reason doctrine is only applicable to indirectly 
discriminatory measures. With the evolvement regarding the restrictions-approach 
being favoured over the discriminations approach, the first two criteria are, in my 
opinion, becoming obsolete in this context.99 My main argument is that measures 
constituting restrictions on the fundamental freedoms may nonetheless be applied in a 
                                                      
99 See for example Ståhl et al., p 149-150. 
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non-discriminatory manner. That leaves us with the two last steps of the Gebhard test 
which mostly, as we shall see, resembles the application of the principle of 
proportionality. Now, the Gebhard case is perhaps more suitable to mention in the 
context of the proportionality assessment on its own. This shall be further discussed 
in chapter four, “Proportionality”.  
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3 General Principles of EU Law 
3.1 A Brief Introduction 
This section will remain brief, as this thesis does not deal with questions related to the 
role and the place of general principles of EU law. It is however, crucial to understand 
the characteristics of the general principles of EU law in order to grasp the role of the 
principle of proportionality as is discussed in the following part of this thesis along 
with the principle of legal certainty.  
 
 
3.1.1 Definition and Characteristics  
Defining a general principle of law is not as straightforward as one might believe from 
first glance. Different scholars have different views on the notion and their utmost 
source varies, depending on a variety of factors including different philosophical views 
of the law. The general principles of law have been distinguished and put into 
different classifications by different scholars. This is especially the case in EU law 
where the term general principles is rather diverse.100 Initially, it should be stated that the 
general principles of EU law, form part of the first segment of sources as has been 
mentioned in the introduction, which are commonly referred to as primary law.101 
 
General principles must have certain denominators, which characterises them and 
qualifies them as general principles of law. When proceeding from the idea that a 
principle is a general proposition of law there are two characteristics that can be found 
within the general legal principles and which may then, function as the common 
denominators. Namely, the general feature and the value it carries.102 Tridimas envisions 
the general feature by contemplating that a general principle operates on a different, 
abstract level, which makes it possible to distinguish it from a rule. He does not 
however, exclude the idea that general might be explained in another, perhaps more 
suitable sense with reference to the scope of application of the different principles. 
The general in general principles of law may then be described as a norm that 
transcends most fields of law and therefore have a large material scope of 
application.103 The general feature allows the principles to exist without any written 
source and it makes their scope of application particularly great. It allows the principle 
to become very adaptable and perhaps not as foreseeable as is perhaps desired. 
 
A general principle of law may therefore be described as a general legal proposition 
from which the norms of the legal system emanate.104 Hence, a general legal principle 
of law can be defined as a value carrying proposition, from which rules may be 
derived and which is general enough for it to operate within different fields of law. 
The general legal principles need no anchoring in the written legal sources, and many 
                                                      
100 See for example Tridimas, General Principles of EU Law, p 2ff. 
101 See for example Rosas & Armati, p 36-37. 
102 Tridimas, p 1.  
103 See Tridimas, p 1ff and p 25ff, Moëll, Proportionalitetsprincipen i skatterätten, p 18-19 and Harbo, The Function of the 
Proportionality Principle in EU Law, p158-185, [p 159]. 
104 Tridimas, p 1. 
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attempts at codifying them have not been greatly successful. Thus, general legal 
principles need neither codification, nor an expression in the law, to be applicable.105 
 
The material scope of application is not limited and the procedural scope of 
application is large, as it is possible to use the general principles of law for different 
procedural reasons. They are not solely used to invalidate norms but may also be used 
within the legislative process, which tells us that they may be expressed in the 
preparatory works of the legislative acts as well.106  
 
There are different ways of categorising the general principles of law and their 
outmost source; however, many of the general principles of law derive from the rule 
of law. Hence, general principles of law may constitute a source of law in most legal 
systems which are based upon the principle of rule of law.107 Consequently, the notion 
regarding the general legal principles of law is not as straightforward and easily 
perceived as one might believe at first glance. Therefore, it is interesting to regard the 
notion itself before plunging deeper into the principle of proportionality.  
 
 
3.1.2 Creation and Beyond  
General principles of EU law are, according to the former President of the European 
Court, the main tool for the judicial development of EU law.108 Rosas and Armati 
stress that the “development of the general principles of law through the case law has undoubtedly 
contributed to the dynamic nature of Union law”109. 
 
Consequently, it is therefore not surprising that the general principles of EU law are 
used to “fill the gaps” of EU law, and that the question of activism occasionally 
surfaces.110 Rosas and Armati suggest promptly that the development of the general 
principles of law by the ECJ is not as radical as we might think, and should not 
insinuate that the elaboration [of those principles] is to be referred to activism as 
mentioned above. They suggest another view to be taken on the matter, and claim that 
general principles, in general, are “simply necessary ingredients in any legal order” and that “if 
the ECJ had not found them, they would have had to be found by someone else”.111 
 
With this brief factual basis the principle of proportionality, as a general principle of 
EU law, shall now be further scrutinised.  
                                                      
105 See for the description on the general principle also, Rodriguez, Iglesias, p 1-2 and his quotation of Sir Gerald 
Fitzmaurice, who proposes that a general principle answers the question ”why?” as opposed to a rule which would 
only possibly be answering the question of ”what?”. 
106 Tridimas, p 1, p 29ff. 
107 Tridimas p 2, see to this extent also Rosas & Armati, p 36-37 and their discussion on the rule of law and its more 
predominant part in the Lisbon Treaty in relation to previous Treaties. 
108 Rodriguez, p 1-2. 
109 Rosas & Armati, p 37. 
110 See to this extent and for further reading concerning the matter of the general principles of EU law, Xavier 
Groussot, General Principles of Community Law, 2006. 
111 Rosas & Armati, p 38. 
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4 Proportionality  
4.1 Introduction 
In the previous section we find the substantial ground for the notion of general 
principles of EU law. It is therefore perhaps too facile to start off by concluding that 
the principle of proportionality may be described as a general principle of law112 and that it 
is commonly referred to as one of the most important general principles of law.113 
Former AG Sir Francis G. Jacobs once said that; “there are few areas of Community law, if 
any at all, where the principle of proportionality is not relevant.”114.115 The principle of 
proportionality is thus present within most fields of Union law in different legal 
contexts. Apart from its large material and procedural scope of application, it is also 
flexible in its requirements depending on the context in which it is used.116  
 
This chapter provides an overview of the notion of proportionality and the principle 
of proportionality and its ground in the different European legal systems.  
 
 
4.2 The Notion of Proportionality 
The notion of proportionality is not an invention of the European Union; instead it 
probably descends from the ancient Greek philosophical society. Proportionality 
would then be expressed with the phrase, all in moderation.117 From a literal point of 
view it is not unimaginable that proportionality would be explained in a similar way 
because a similar explanation is given when a dictionary is consulted. Therein 
proportionality is explained as a mathematical expression that describes a connection between two 
greater things.118 From a legal perspective we view proportionality expressed through a 
general legal principle of law, which underpins every legal society based on the rule of 
law. In fact, when proportionality is viewed in the light of the rule of law we 
understand the explanation given by the dictionary, where proportionality would 
influence the relationship between the legal authority and the people submitted under 
the legal system. More precisely, we might describe the notion of proportionality as a 
balancing act between two interests, often protection of the rights of the individual in 
the society.119 Thus, even in a legal context, it is possible to describe the notion of 
proportionality as something that regulates the relationship between two greater 
things. Two things that must be balanced in order to be proportionate, in other words, 
they must be in proportion to one another.120 This argument is of course very 
technical as it does not tell us at what state two interests are in proportion to each 
other nor does it reveal what needs to be taken into account when proportionality is 
sought after. Reaching the state of balance where two interests are in proportion is 
perhaps not always the result when applying the principle of proportionality, at least 
not when it is used as a tool to achieve certain objectives.  Proportion is not 
                                                      
112 Moëll, p 15, Craig & de Búrca, EU law: Text, Cases, and Materials, p 109. 
113 Moëll, p 15, Craig & de Búrca, EU law: Text, Cases, and Materials, p 109. 
114 Case C-120/94 Commission v Greece/FYROM. 
115 Moëll, p 18. 
116 Moëll, p 18. 
117 Tridimas, p 136. 
118 Nationalencyklopedin, ”proportionalitet” egen översättning. 
119 Moëll, p 35. 
120 Tridimas, p 136, Helminen, p 6. 
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determined in advance, it is a rather fluctuant state which depends on the action which 
is being undertaken, and which interests the action might jeopardise or compromise. 
The underlying interest, as Tridimas emphasises, which proportionality seeks to protect 
in different legal contexts varies diversely. Consequently, the methodology of the 
application of the principle of proportionality may vary depending on the contexts, 
and it may also vary depending on the relevant interests in question.121  
 
 
4.3 Understanding the Principle of 
Porportionality  
In order to properly understand the principle of proportionality as such and its 
developments in EU law, one needs to revisit the history of the Union as well as the 
heritage of the principle of proportionality. Following these sections the principle of 
proportionality will be discussed in the light of its characteristics as a general principle 
of EU law, as well as the expression of the principle in the justification process. 
Firstly, the history of the European Union shall be revisited briefly to be able to put 
the evolution of the Union law into perspective.  
 
 
4.3.1 Historical Perspective on the Union 
A contemporary analysis of the law of the European Union must be put into its 
historical background and context. The cradle of the European Union was created 
during the 1950s in a Europe that had been destroyed in many ways. In the aftermath 
of the Second World War the Europeans desired a change in the political climate and 
for nationalism to be forgotten. At this exact moment the world was about to change 
as the new political winds, influenced by the general political climate in the world was 
blowing also in Europe. America, a leading super nation announced its willingness to 
assist Europe with financial aid for a restoration through the Marshall Plan in 1947. 
During the same year, America had agreed to sign the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade122, with the intention being to make way for a more liberalised world trade. 
During the same period, the North Atlantic Treaty, Organisation for European 
Economic Development which was later to become the Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, the Western European Union and the Benelux 
Treaty were established within the geographical territory of Europe. Despite the 
constant threat of an out break of an additional world war breathing down the neck of 
Europe it was at this time that the cradle of what we today refer to as the European 
Union was established through the Euratom and the European Economic 
Community. Not long after that had the original Member States signed the Statue on 
the Council of Europe making way for a new political order. Finally, in 1950, the 
European Convention on Human Rights was signed and came into force in 1953. The 
Europe that had been destroyed in the Second World War was, along with the rest of 
the western world, entering a phase of development and recuperation.123 
 
                                                      
121 Tridimas, p 137. 
122 GATT. 
123 Craig & de Búrca, p 4. 
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The establishment of the common market was one of the many objectives of the 
primary treaties124 and the objective was to be established over a transitional period of 
several stages.125 This thesis does not primarily focus on political theories but it needs 
to be emphasised that politics and different eras of the evolution of the European 
Union was and still is, affected by different political theories on integration which, is 
thus reflected in the political climate of our time.  
 
It should also be stressed in this section, without any subjective political views 
steaming through, that the principle of proportionality has shown to be an effective 
tool for the economic integration in the Union.126 As the field of direct taxation is 
adversely politically infected, legal questions and issues relating to the field of direct 
taxation can easily slide in to a question of the scope of application of the Court and it 
can be questioned whether case law of the Court is always separated from political 
views.127  
 
 
4.3.2 Heritage in the European Legal Systems 
 
The principle of proportionality is said to constitute a general principle of law 
underpinning most legal systems built on the premise of the rule of law. However, 
traces of proportionality as a notion may be traced further back in history than just the 
establishment of our, in this sense, rather modern legal systems. Proportionality may 
be said to have its roots in the ancient Greek dictum pan metron ariston, which has 
roughly been translated into “all in moderation”.128  
 
Proportionality, expressed through the principle of proportionality has a given place in 
most modern legal systems. It has been promptly advertised by German academics 
because the principle of proportionality has a given role in the German legal system. 
The notion governed by the principle of proportionality may be found in other 
European legal systems as well, notwithstanding that the name, content and 
application of it varies dramatically.129 The reasons to the great variation of the 
aforesaid factors are to some extent obvious, as not all legal systems found in Europe 
rest on the same ground and therefore the constitutional law plays an important part 
in defining the principle or proportionality within each legal system.130  
 
A lot of focus, when referring to the evolvement of the principle of proportionality 
within the different legal systems, is often placed on the structure of  powers between 
the different administrative organs. When advocating for a structure where the power 
to legislate, execute and judge is separated on different institutions, it is not 
uncommon that one is less inclined to provide the judiciary power with the principle 
of proportionality as a tool to review the lawfulness of enacted legislative acts or 
reviewing the material content of an official decision and overruling it. This is for 
example the concern with the principle of proportionality in the French legal 
system.131  
                                                      
124 The Treaty of Rome adopted in 1958 establishes the common market as an objective of the Union [then the 
Community]. 
125 Barnard, p 8ff. 
126 Moëll, p 110-111. 
127 Moëll, p 110-111. 
128 See Tridimas, p 136 and Petursson, p 132. 
129 Tridimas, p 136-137, Moëll, p 35, see for example the principle of unreasonableness as was established through the 
Wednesbury case in the UK. 
130 Moëll, p 23. 
131 Moëll, p 23. 
 31 
 
Although the principle of proportionality is commonly referred to as existing, or 
having its heritage in different European legal orders, the principle has different status 
and characteristics within each of these legal orders. It has been argued that the 
principle of proportionality exists for example within the French legal system132, 
although the principle is not regarded as a general principle of law, as that concept is 
unfamiliar to the French legal tradition. Nonetheless, the principle of proportionality 
can be distinguished in the complexity of the French law, although not accepted as a 
general principle of law per se.133 
 
The German perception on the principle of proportionality is of intriguing value in 
this section as it is perhaps where the principle of proportionality we know as a 
general principle of EU law, has most of its heritage. Even though the principle had 
been applied in early employment cases134 it was not until AG Dutheillet de Lamothe 
properly discussed it that the principle can be said to have rooted in the European 
legal order. However, traces of the principle of proportionality as a ground for review 
of measures can be traced back even further to the 1950s. It was not however, until 
the 1970s that the Court contemplated its role in this context.  
 
In the case Internationale Handelsgesellschaft the Court was asked to deliver a preliminary 
ruling on the compatibility of a Community regulation concerning a system of 
deposits which formed part of the import and export licenses for agricultural 
products. The German corporation found these requirements, imposed by the 
regulation, to constitute an obstacle against the fundamental freedoms and it therefore 
challenged the decision in the national court. Unsure how to interpret this, and 
perhaps eager to receive an acknowledgment of the principle of proportionality, the 
German court stayed the proceeding and referred a question for preliminary ruling 
concerning the interpretation of Community law. At this time, two other, similar 
questions had been referred to the Court and AG Dutheillet de Lamothe gave a joined 
opinion on the matter.135 The principle of proportionality, presented by the national 
court, was perceived as a fundamental right which, in this case did not result in a 
preclusion of the Community measures in question. The Court therefore found the 
Community regulation, laying down the system of deposits, to be an appropriate 
method for the objective that the regulation pursued.136 The wording reveals that 
there was no explicit reference to the principle of proportionality in the judgement, 
however, AG Dutheillet de Lamothe had discussed it rather extensively in his 
opinion.137  
 
The application of the principle in the context of review of domestic measures was 
not discovered until the 1980s where the litigation increased and the Member States 
had adapted to the new supranational order that the Union represents.138  
 
It is not completely surprising that the first case where the principle of proportionality 
was discussed was in a case relating to Germany as the principle of proportionality 
already had a given role in the German legal system.139 According to German law the 
principle of proportionality entails three criteria: 
                                                      
132 See for example Tridimas, Proportionality in European Community Law: Searching for the Appropriate Standard of Scrutiny, p 
65-84 (ed.) Ellis, [p 65]. 
133 van Gerven, The Effect of Proportionality in the Actions of Member States of the European Community: National Viewpoints from 
Continental Europe, p 37-63 [p 44-48], Moëll, p 26-30. 
134 See for example Tridimas, p 141 and the case law he refers to such as Case 18/63 Wollast v EEC. 
135 See AG Dutheillet de Lamothe, Opinion delivered on 2 December 1970. 
136 Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellshaft, para 19-20 (IBFD), para 12 at page 1136.  
137 See Tridimas, p 136, Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, para 12 at page 1136. It should however be 
mentioned here, that AG Dutheillet de Lamothe explicitly referred to the principle of proportionality. 
138 Tridimas, p 141-142. 
139 van Gerven, p 44-48. 
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1. Appropriate 
2. Necessity 
3. Proportionality (sensu stricto) 
 
Although these exact criteria were not mentioned by the Court in the Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft case they have since surfaced in plenty of the case law of the Court in 
recent years and it is possible to conclude that the German view on the principle of 
proportionality is the one which, has influenced the principle of proportionality found 
in the Union law.140  
 
4.3.3 The Content of the Principle Itself 
Regardless of the fact that the notion of proportionality may be deduced to a 
relationship between two greater things, which are balanced against each other, the 
principle of proportionality has many sides and depending on the action questioned, 
different factors and tests may be gathered from the principle.141 Proportionality in 
relation to measures adopted by the different institutions of the Union often 
showcases the principle of proportionality in a different way. In such cases a measure 
is often142 considered proportionate unless it is manifestly unsuitable or inappropriate.143  
However, when the principle of proportionality is referred to, in the context of 
whether domestic measures are compatible with the Treaty, the principle of 
proportionality is not always explicitly mentioned as such. More often the Court 
stipulates that the measures in question must be appropriate and necessary to achieve its 
objectives.144  
 
Consequently, we understand that the principle of proportionality, as a general 
principle of EU law, may be explained as requiring that measures undertaken must be 
proportionate to their objectives. Here, the wording proportionality entails three, or 
sometimes only two, requirements. In accordance with the German understanding of 
the principle of proportionality, which has greatly influenced the reasoning of the 
Court145, although that was not fully the case when the principle of proportionality 
first surfaced in the Internationale Handelsgeselleshaft case146, proportionality consists of 
requirements which have to be evaluated, discussed and finally fulfilled in order for 
the measures in question to be proportionate to its objectives. Moreover, 
proportionality is an act of balancing the effect of the measures against the interests 
of, in this case, the Member States and their citizens.147  
 
Tridimas explains the principle of proportionality, on the most abstract level, as a 
principle that requires that “the actions undertaken must be proportionate to its objectives”148 
and from this he deduces two tests in order to construct the principle of 
proportionality. 
 
1. The test of suitability; 
2. The test of necessity.  
                                                      
140 Moëll, p 108-109. 
141 See previous section for further reference. 
142 Note that this is not consistently used by the Court when Community measures are being questioned, see for 
example Case 114/76 Bela-Mühle, however, the case was not against the [then] Community in question. 
143 See to this extent Moëll, p 145 and therein quoted Case 59/83 SA Biovilac. 
144 Tridimas, p 139. 
145 Jacobs, Recent Developments in the Principle of Proportionality in European Community Law, p 1-21, [p 1ff]. 
146 See earlier reference.  
147 Tridimas, (ed.) Ellis, p 65-66. 
148 Tridimas, (ed.) Ellis, p 65. 
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The suitability test is used in order to determine whether the measures in question are 
adequate to attain the aim of the measure. It has also been explained in the literature 
as the relationship between the means and the ends.149 This test can be seen in the 
reasoning of the Court when it refers to appropriate within the justification process. 
 
The second test is usually referred to as the necessity test and it constitutes the final 
balancing act between the two concerned interests as mentioned in the section 
above.150 The Court performs the second test by weighing the competing interests 
against each other. Barnard explains the test with the following sentence;  
 
“What consequences does the measure have on the interest worthy of protections and are 
those consequences justified in view of the importance of the objective pursued?”151 
 
The last part of the second test has sometimes been viewed as having two features. It 
may in this context also be put forth that the second test does often come to 
expression through the application of the phrase “whether less restrictive means could 
have been employed instead”, which is why it is sometimes referred to as the “less 
restrictive means” test.152 
 
 
4.3.4 Proportionality in the Legal Framework of 
the European Union  
The principle of proportionality is despite the probable ancient reference, a principle 
which, have been influenced by the same ideas that have influenced the liberal 
democracy to flourish.153 Bearing in mind what was discussed in the previous chapter 
regarding the characteristics of a general principle of law, those features shall now be 
discussed with reference to the principle of proportionality as a general principle of 
EU law, with the constant reminder of its heritage in the European legal orders. 
 
The principle of proportionality is explicitly expressed in the Treaty of Lisbon, and 
traces of it go back to the time of the Treaty of Rome.154 
 
“Art 5 TEU 
 
1. The limits of Union competences are governed by the principle of conferral. 
The use of Union competences is governed by the principles of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.  
 
[…] 
4. Under the principle of proportionality, the content and form of Union 
action shall not exceed what is necessary to achieve the objectives of the 
Treaties. 
 
                                                      
149 Barnard p 177f, p 534. 
150 See for reference Barnard p 177, p 534. 
151 Barnard, p 177. 
152 Barnard, p 178, Helminen, p 44. 
153 Tridimas, p 136. 
154 See also the AG opinion in Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, as the principle is therein referred to by the 
AG as a principle of Community, emanating from the rule of law, p 1146. 
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The institutions of the Union shall apply the principle of proportionality as 
laid down in the Protocol on the application of the principles of subsidiarity 
and proportionality.” 
 
These two paragraphs both express the need to consult the principle of 
proportionality. Firstly, the powers conferred upon the Union (principle of conferral) 
must be exercised in a way that is consistent with the principle of proportionality and 
the principle of subsidiarity. Hence, these two principles are in this context what is 
commonly referred to as a corollary to the principle of conferral. The principle of 
conferral is the legal principle on which the competence of the Union is based and the 
principles of proportionality and subsidiarity tell us to what extent these powers given 
by virtue of the principle of conferral may be utilized by the Union. The last 
paragraph mentions the Protocol on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and 
proportionality.155 
 
The principle of proportionality ensures that the Union exercises its legislative 
competence correctly, expressed as mentioned above in art 5 of the Lisbon Treaty. 
The boundaries are however, not outset within the Treaty and the competence 
basically, as can be seen in the field of direct taxation, extends to what is necessary in 
order to achieve the objectives and missions of the European Union. Consequently, 
the competence of the Union is rather functional.156  
 
Additionally, the principle of proportionality has two other primary functions within 
Union law, which are not explicitly expressed in the Treaty. The principle is used as a 
ground for review of measures taken by the institutions of the Union, as well as for 
review of measures taken by the Member States which impacts the fundamental 
freedoms.157 Rosas and Armati stress that the principle of proportionality constitutes a 
judge-made principle entailing the purpose of protecting the fundamental rights [or as 
is referred to in this thesis “freedoms”], and the principle of proportionality, as a 
general principle of EU law, will, in the context of the compatibility assessment, 
constitute a tool for regulating the right proportions of the relationship between the 
Union and its citizens.158  
 
 
4.4 The Proportionality Assessment 
Found in the Reasoning of the Court 
The following section is primarily focused on the principle of proportionality used 
when assessing the compatibility of domestic measures with the fundamental 
freedoms. 
 
The content of the principle of proportionality as such have been discussed above. 
This section is for obvious reasons intertwined with the content of the principle of 
proportionality. Therefore, we shall remember the issues discussed above when 
pursuing this section.  
 
                                                      
155 The Protocol no (2) on the on the application of the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality, Official Journal of 
the European Union, C 83/206 30.3.2010, annexed to the TFEU and the TEU, first introduced with the Treaty of 
Amsterdam. 
156 Rosas & Armati, p 17. 
157 Tridimas, p 137, Moëll, p 128. 
158 Rosas & Armati, p 38. 
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Historically we understand from previous discussions that the principle of 
proportionality, used in the final step of the justification process, has been greatly 
influenced by the German perception on the principle of proportionality.159 As the 
internal market was one of the many first economic objectives established by the 
Union it is not unimaginable that the fundamental freedoms where initially used to 
assess the compatibility of rules belonging to the agricultural field of law. As a 
harmonised field of law, it is neither surprising that the development of the principle 
of proportionality mostly occurred when assessing Community measures.  However, 
today the number of cases relating to the field of agricultural law has diminished and 
instead we see an increasing amount of case law relating to other fields of law, and 
primarily regarding the question of compatibility of domestic measures.  
 
The status quo of the evolution of the principle of proportionality, in a general EU 
law context, may be referred to as the following: A measure must be appropriate and 
necessary in order to achieve its objectives. This is frequently reiterated in the case law 
of the Court concerning the last step in the assessment of a potential breach of the 
fundamental freedoms.160  
 
The assessment made by the Court may be described with reference to Tridimas 
explanation on the content of the principle of proportionality. Commonly, the Court 
refers to the Gebhard case or test which have been discussed in previous sections. In 
order for domestic measures to be proportionate they have to fulfil the substantive 
requirements imposed by the principle of proportionality. This is expressed in the two 
last steps of the justification process provided by the Gebhard case: 
 
1. The rules must be suitable for securing the attainment of the objective which they pursue; 
and 
2. The rules must not go beyond what is necessary in order to attain it.161 
 
In similarity with Tridimas, the Court tends to discuss the appropriateness or 
suitability of the measures in question in relation to the objectives they pursue. 
Secondly the domestic measures must not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain those objectives. Occasionally this step is referred to the “the least restrictive 
test” as seen above. The court would therefore in this regard perform a balancing act 
of the relevant interests.162  
 
Perhaps it could be contemplated that the last step entails a proportionality assessment 
sensu stricto as is seen in the German perception on the principle of proportionality. It 
may however, be concluded that whether the proportionality assessment is regarded as 
a step on its own or not does not matter. The content within is what is relevant and 
when the proportionality assessment is stripped down, all the Court has to do, is to 
rely on the substantive part of the principle of proportionality expressed in a balancing 
act.  
 
 
 
 
                                                      
159 See section above 4.3.2. 
160 See section 2.3.4.3 and 2.3.4.4 above and Case C-55/94 Gebhard. 
161 Case C-55/94 Gebhard, para 37 se also Barnard, p 528. 
162 Barnard, p 177-178. 
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4.5 Other Expressions of Proportionality – 
Additional Steps to Fulfill? 
Previously the substantive side and the content of the principle of proportionality 
have been discussed. This section is dedicated to the procedural side of the principle 
of proportionality. 
 
 
4.5.1 Procedural Requirements and Beyond 
Within Union law there are a number of principles that may be referred to as having a 
procedural feature. That is for example the case with inter alia the principle of good 
governance163, the principle of the protection of good faith, the principle of 
effectiveness and the principle of legal certainty.164 Sporadically, these principles 
surface within the proportionality assessment comprising of what may be referred to 
as the procedural requirements of proportionality, or the proceduralization of the 
principle of proportionality.165 
 
Prechal166 has identified that the principle of proportionality might entail more than 
just a substantive content. With that being said it might be more accurate to describe 
this part of the principle of proportionality as part of the material content of the 
principle itself, but with the distinction that this material content concerns procedural 
requirements posed by the principle of proportionality. In this regard Prechal 
distinguishes two additional sides of the proportionality test that need to be fulfilled in 
order for the proportionality test to be fulfilled. She characterises them as procedural 
guarantees which are then divided into two groups. The first group concerns judicial 
review and the second administrative procedures. Consequently, in comparison to the 
previous section where, what is commonly referred to as the substantive part of the 
principle of proportionality, this represents the procedural part of that principle.167 
The case law where the Court has upheld additional procedural requirements in order 
for the measures in question to be proportionate is rich and is not restricted to one 
type of measure or to one field of law.  
 
In the Muller168 and the German Beer169 cases, which both concerned the free movement 
of goods, the Court imposed additional requirements linked to the principle of good 
governance. The Court concluded that the principle of proportionality requires that 
the procedure in question, which according to the domestic measures must be 
undertaken, have to be easily accessible and concluded within a reasonable time. 
Following this the Court elaborated on the conditions that good governance, as an 
additional requirement to proportionality, imposes on the domestic measure, and 
additional developments may be seen in Greenham & Abel170. 
 
                                                      
163 Commonly used within the proportionality assessment in previous case law. See to this extent for example, Case C-
124/97 Läärä and Others, Case C-344/90 Commission v France. 
164 Helminen, p 7. 
165 S. Prechal, Topic One: National Applications of the Proportionality Principle – Free Movement and Procedural requirements: 
proportionality Reconsidered, p 201-216 and Hettne, Rättsprinciper som styrmedel: allmänna rättsprinciper i EU:s domstol, p 121-
143. 
166 Prechal, p 201-216. 
167 Prechal, p 201-202. 
168 Case 304/84 Muller. 
169 Case 178/84 German Beer. 
170 Case C-95/01 Greenham & Abel. 
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To conclude, Prechal argues her point with reference to a number of different 
procedural guarantees which must be met in order for the measures in question to 
comply with the articles of the Treaty. Mostly, in this regard with relation to rules 
governed by an authorisation procedure. The main point that she concludes in this 
regard is the need to establish and be aware of the exercise of the national authorities’ 
discretion.171 Also further, she advocates for the principle of proportionality as not 
amounting to the adequate tool to govern the requirements of procedural guarantees, 
and admittedly, she contemplates how these procedures fit into the substantive 
principle of proportionality, as we have seen expressed above.172 Similarly, de Vries 
contemplates that the procedural requirements might be an alternative tool or 
procedure to the balancing act that the Court uses when dealing with conflicting 
interests.173  
 
The conclusion that the principle of proportionality imposes additional requirements 
in certain situations is not unfamiliar. Hettne174 also puts forth additional requirements 
in order for the principle of proportionality to be fulfilled within the justification 
process. He puts forth a list of requirements, which includes for example legal 
certainty, he is however reluctant to believe that creating a list of procedural 
requirements of proportionality is desirable.175 Petursson also makes the discovery 
regarding the procedural requirements as Prechal does, although he contemplates that 
the procedural requirements constitute one additional element to the principle of 
proportionality, whereas he refers to the second requirement as the consistency test.176 
 
The argument regarding the importance of the discretionary power used by the 
authorities and the characteristics of the measures or actions is advocated inter alia, van 
Gerven and Moëll.177 van Gerven further stresses, with regard to the principle of 
proportionality in general that, even the Court itself has the impression that, even 
thought the principle of proportionality has explicitly been acknowledged as a general 
principle of EU law, its content is versatile and more often than not, does the Court 
give the principle a different meaning.  
 
It must however, in this regard be mentioned that most of these arguments have been 
put forward by EU law scholars, whose primary focus on EU law in general, and not 
with a focus on measures relating to direct taxation. The obvious question to ask 
oneself in this regard is perhaps whether these requirements can be said to form part 
of the principle of proportionality when the Court, through a preliminary ruling is 
evaluating measures belonging to the field of direct taxation? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
171 Prechal, p 201-202, 208. 
172 Prechal, p 214-216. 
173 de Vries, Balancing Fundamental Rights with Economic Freedoms According to the European Court of Justice, Utrecht Law 
Review, p 169-192, [p 170-172]. 
174 Hettne, p 121-143. 
175 Hettne, p 142 see also p, 136-137 with regard to the golden shares case. 
176 Petursson, p 161-162 
177 van Gerven, p 61, Moëll, p 122-127. 
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4.6 Summary and Conclusions 
With the foregoing section still in mind, it is with no doubt that I draw the conclusion 
that the principle of proportionality is more complex, flexible and vague, than how it 
first may be perceived.178 Even the Court tends to draw the same conclusion, at least 
according to van Gerven. The principle of proportionality may be seen as a tool, 
offered to the Court in order to achieve the objectives outset in the Treaty. Indeed it 
offers the Court a possibility to be extremely flexible in its judgment and therefore it 
may be concluded that the Court is armed with a discretionary power that it perhaps 
should not have access to.179 This is best perceived from a historical perspective as the 
principle of proportionality has different roles within different European legal 
systems. Therefore the concerns regarding the principle of proportionality as a tool 
are not few.  
 
The principle of proportionality and the proportionality assessment are intertwined to 
the extent that one could conclude that the latter one is a pure expression of the first 
one. In the most facile expression, proportionality may be expressed as a balance 
between two conflicting interests. Perhaps, this is just as Tridimas explains it, 
proportionality on its most abstract level. He explains the principle of proportionality 
as a balance in the relationship between the measures and the objectives that those 
measures pursue (the suitability test). Secondly, he contemplates that there should be a 
balance between the conflicting interests, could less restrictive means have been 
adopted? (The necessity test or “the least restrictive means test”). Occasionally it has 
been held that there is more to the proportionality assessment. A final assessment of 
all the circumstances of the case which culminates in a giant balancing act. There are 
no doubts that these arguments have some rooting in the case law as well. However, it 
may also be viewed as an indication of the issues the Court itself has with 
understanding the content of the principle of proportionality. The heritage of the 
principle of proportionality does not facilitate the question of its content in this 
regard.  
 
The procedural side to the principle of proportionality is also found in the case law of 
the Court. Undoubted these procedural requirements have been used occasionally as 
additional requirements to proportionality, but perhaps they shall not be viewed as 
additional requirements but merely as a different expression of proportionality. This is 
the explanation Prechal and de Vries put forth. Perhaps the procedural requirements 
is an alternative to the balancing act that we are so familiar, but yet so unfamiliar with. 
The concern I have with the balancing act is how to we know when all things [read: 
interests] are in moderation, and more important, who decides what makes the scales 
tip? 
 
Perhaps, we should rethink the, as Prechal expresses it, “strained construction” that 
the principle constitutes within the justification process. Perhaps we should not try to 
force further requirements into the proportionality assessment, as they do not fit 
naturally within the principle of proportionality, perhaps they should instead be the 
procedural principles that they are. This might make us question proportionality in 
general, what does it really entail? This further supports the counter argument to the 
point made earlier. Because even EU law and the European Court of Justice have to 
be somewhat foreseeable, right? 
 
                                                      
178 See support for the vagueness, by van Gerven, p 60. 
179 See previous chapter on activism etc.  
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5 What is Legal Certainty? 
Perhaps the caption of this chapter is suitable for a master’s thesis itself I shall 
however, briefly touch upon the matter of legal certainty before culminating this thesis 
in an analysis.  
 
 
5.1 Legal Certainty as a General Principle 
of Law 
The principle of legal certainty is often expressed through the corollary, the protection 
of legitimate expectations. The primary premise of the principle of legal certainty may 
be described in the following way:  
 
the person subject to the law shall know the law, so that he or she may plan 
his or her actions accordingly.180  
 
Tridimas argues that the principle of legal certainty might be even more important 
than the principle of equality, as legal certainty offers the possibility to plan your 
actions in advance, and be certain of the outcome. Therefore he further contemplates 
that the principle of legal certainty has a strong importance within economic law, such 
a tax law.181 Just as the principle of proportionality, previously discussed, the principle 
of legal certainty has a natural relationship with the rule of law and, applying a broader 
perspective we notice its existence within other legal systems as well.182 The principle 
of legal certainty has been given a greater role within the French legal system than the 
principle of proportionality. In Germany it has been developed within the case law, 
and in England it has made way for a prosperous academic discussion.  
 
The content of the principle of legal certainty has been considered to be rather vague 
and when invoked within different contexts it tends to entail a diverse spread of 
substantive and procedural criteria.183 Thus, perhaps with regard to the close affinity 
with the rule of law it is with little hesitance that the principle of legal certainty may be 
classified as a general principle of law.184 Tridimas explains the content of the principle 
with reference to a number of case law and summarises the content of the principle by 
distinguishing five general criteria that the principle entails.185 The case law scrutinised 
by Tridimas concerns the issue of where Union measures are in breach of legal 
certainty, consequently, the case law and the criteria does not fully relate to the issues 
when the domestic measures of the Member States are in breach of legal certainty. 
Nonetheless, the criteria may be put forth as an indication on what the principle of 
legal certainty entails.  
 
- Clarity of [then] Community measures186  
- Full enforcement of [then] Community law187 
                                                      
180 Tridimas, p 242. 
181 Tridimas, p 242. 
182 Tridimas, p 242. 
183 See for example Peters, p 112-114. 
184 Tridimas, p 242-244, Groussot, p 38. 
185 Tridimas, p 244. 
186 Tridimas, p 244-246. 
187 Tridimas, p 246-248. 
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- Unity and coherence of the [then] Community legal order188 
- Protection of Member States189 
- Procedural exclusivity190 
 
In the context of lawfulness of domestic measures in the Member States the principle 
of legal certainty is perhaps more abstract and mostly utilised in its most basic 
description. That basic description being as Peters191 explains it:  
 
“Legal certainty presupposes indeed that the legal subject must (be able to) 
have certainty about the legislation that should be applicable to him, or in 
other terms, that he must be able to foresee beforehand that the intended legal 
act will not give rise to disputes in court.”192 
 
His expression encompasses indeed how the principle of legal certainty may be 
described on a general level, indeed perhaps suitable for a general principle of EU law. 
Peters argues that the concept of legal certainty is too vague in itself, and that there is 
a fine line between flexibility and precision. Legal certainty requires, from his 
perspective that a legal rule must be enough flexible to leave room for future 
circumstances, and even though there is a requirement of precision, this should not, in 
Peters’ view, be perceived in a too strict sense.193  
Consequently, legal certainty, as a general principle of EU law, does not therefore 
impose a requirement on domestic measures to be utterly strict and unbendable. 
Instead it allows for certain amount of flexibility, and the usage of less precise 
wordings and definitions within the domestic measures.194 
 
 
5.2 Legal Certainty Takes Presence in the 
Case Law of the Court  
Following the ITELCAR case the case law of the Court relating to the field of direct 
taxation has not touched upon the matter of legal certainty as a requirement for 
proportionality yet. However, in the case C-362/12 Test Claimants in the Franked 
Investment Income Group Litigation, the Court spoke of legal certainty and what it 
encompasses. The case in question concerned remedies, and more specifically 
restitutions of sums paid but not due, in the light of the previous FII Cases.195 
Consequently the case did not directly touch upon the matter of legal certainty as an 
additional requirement for proportionality with regard to measures belonging to the 
field of direct taxation, nevertheless, the Court held that; 
 
“the principle of legal certainty […] requires that rules involving negative 
consequences for individuals should be predictable for those subject to them.”196  
 
                                                      
188 Tridimas, p 248. 
189 Tridimas, p 248-249. 
190 Tridimas, p 249. 
191 B. Peters, European Supervision on the Use of Vague and Undetermined Concepts in Tax Laws, EC Tax Review, p 112-114. 
192 Peters, p 113. 
193 Peters, p 112. 
194 Peters, p 112-113. 
195 See previously mentioned cases Case C-35/11 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation and Case C-446/04 Test 
Claimants in the FII Group Litigation. 
196 Case C-362/12 Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation, para 44. 
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In this context the Court referred to case C-17/03 VEMW and others, a case, which 
concerned questions relating to the internal market in electricity concerning a directive 
issued on the matter and not the fundamental freedoms.  
 
Legal certainty has, according to Hettne,197 a prominent role in the case law of the 
Court. Although he makes plenty of references to where the principle of legal 
certainty has been used within other legal contexts rather than seen as an additional 
step within the proportionality assessment, his findings are indeed relevant.198 He, 
alongside Prechal, discussed above, mentions the golden shares case and the Church of 
Scientology case. In both cases the principle of legal certainty was given a determinative 
role in the question on whether the measures in question were justifiable.  
 
In the Church of Scientology199 case the question concerned French rules which imposed 
an authorisation prior to certain type of direct foreign investment. The rules in 
question stipulated that the Government of France could, with a view of ensuring the 
defence of national interests make certain direct investments subject to a declaration prior 
to an authorisation or a control. The Court however, concluded the following: 
 
Para 21-22: 
 
“[…]the essence of the system in question is that prior authorisation is 
required for every direct foreign investment which is such as to represent a 
threat to public policy [and] public security, without any more detailed 
definition. Thus, the investors concerned are given no indication whatever as to 
the specific circumstances in which prior authorisation is required. 
 
Such lack of precision does not enable individuals to be apprised of the extent 
of their rights and obligations deriving from Article 73b of the Treaty. That 
being so, the system established is contrary to the principle of legal 
certainty.”200 
 
The domestic measures lacked precision, not in itself by because there was no clarity 
in the expression “threat to public policy and security”. Hence, they were not sufficiently 
precise and did therefore not fulfil the principle of legal certainty. The measures could 
not be considered proportionate by virtue of not fulfilling the principle of legal 
certainty. Consequently, the proportionality test was used in this regard, with relation 
to the justification grounds provided by the Treaty.201 
 
The golden shares202 case concerned a similar legislation. France had adopted rules 
concerning its “golden shares” in Société Nationale Elf-Aquitaine, a petroleum 
corporation. The measures under review in this case imposed an authorisation in 
advance by the Minister of Economic Affairs if the total holdings of a shareholder 
reached a predefined ceiling. The Court came to the conclusion that these rules where 
liable to restrict the free movement of capital, however, the rules could be justified 
with reference to the public security. (Because these rules governed the safeguarding 
of supplies of petroleum products in situation of crisis.) Although the justification 
ground is explicitly expressed in the Treaty, the proportionality assessment within the 
justification process still has to be satisfied. The issue that the Court found was that 
                                                      
197 Hettne, p 127-128. 
198 See for example cases relating to the obligations imposed on the Member States to fulfil its obligations, Case C-
363/85 Commission v Italy, Case C-59/89 Commission v Germany. 
199 Case C-54/99 Church of Scientology. 
200 See Case C-54/99 Church of Scientology, para 21-22. 
201 Case C-54/99 Church of Scientology, para 19 with references made to Case C-358/93 and C-419/93 Bordessa and Others, 
and Case C-302/97 Konle v Austria. 
202 Case C-483/99 golden shares. 
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the rules governing the authorisation procedure where vague and no indications on 
when an authorisation would be granted or refused were stipulated in the rules. 
Therefore, with reference to the vagueness of those rules, the Court concluded the 
following: 
 
“Such lack of precision does not enable individuals to be apprised of the extent of their rights and 
obligations […] That being so, such a system must be regarded as contrary to the principle of legal 
certainty[…]”203 
 
Hence, there was no legal certainty within the application of those rules and therefore 
they did not fulfil the proportionality assessment within the justification process. 204 
To conclude, the principle of legal certainty has an important role within the 
justification process. Following this section the Laval case shall be presented.  
 
 
5.3 Legal Certainty as an Additional 
Requirement for Proportionality 
Legal certainty as a requirement for proportionality within the proportionality 
assessment has been found in other fields of law besides tax law. This section 
therefore seeks to broaden the view of the reader with the previous section in mind. 
 
 
5.3.1 The Laval-case 
In the Laval205 case the Court was asked to rule on the interpretation of the general 
prohibition of discrimination, now found in article 18, the free movement of services, 
art 56 and Directive 96/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 
December 1996 concerning the posting of workers in the framework of the provision 
of services. Laval, a Latvian corporation had posed workers to perform services on a 
building site lead by a Swedish corporation called Baltic Bygg AB. Due to a number of 
reasons, the trade union took collective action against Laval for not signing collective 
agreements proposed by the trade unions. The unions persisted Laval to sign the 
agreement before the negotiations on wages begun.206 Collective sympathy actions 
where then taken by other trade unions since no agreement had been made during the 
negotiations and the building company in Sweden, Baltic Bygg AB, was declared 
bankrupt. 
 
Laval brought the actions to the Swedish labour law court and asked for the collective 
actions taken against it to be declared unlawful and additionally for damages from the 
trade unions in question. The court however, was unsure as how to interpret the 
above mentioned articles and referred a question for a preliminary ruling at the ECJ. 
 
The issue at hand concerns lex Britannia207, three article in the Swedish law limiting the 
rights for syndicates and trade unions to take collective action against their employer 
                                                      
203 Case C-483/99 golden shares, para 50. 
204 Case C-483/99 golden shares, para 49-50. 
205 Case C-341/05 Laval. 
206 The Swedish labour law system is mainly built on the collective agreements and precedence; hence it concerns the 
agreement between the trade unions, or syndicates and the employer. The law therefore establishes no minimum wage 
but it is however, reinforced by the collective agreements.  
207 See Articles 25a, 31a and the third paragraph of Article 42 MBL, Lex Britannia is the effect of another ruling. 
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in order to have a collective agreement between other parties be set aside or amended. 
Such prohibition against collective action is, according to the ruling in the Britannia 
case, enforceable also against foreign employers if the legislation where they are 
established also prohibits such collective action. 
 
After dealing with questions concerning admissibility and the rules governed by the 
directive as mentioned above, the Court concludes that the rules governing the right 
for the trade unions to take collective actions by which they may force the employer, 
established in another Member State, to sign collective agreements containing more 
favourable terms or terms departing from what is established by the relevant directive, 
is liable to make it less attractive or more difficult for foreign establishments to pursue 
such construction work in Sweden.208  
 
Consequently, the Court moves on to state the following with reference to case law of 
the Court, as for example the avoir fiscal case.  
 
Para 101:  
 
“It is clear from the case-law of the Court that, since the freedom to provide 
services is one of the fundamental principles of the Community […], a 
restriction on that freedom is warranted only if it pursues a legitimate objective 
compatible with the Treaty and is justified by overriding reasons of public 
interest; if that is the case, it must be suitable for securing the attainment of 
the objective which it pursues and not go beyond what is necessary in order to 
attain it.[…]” 
 
The domestic measures in question in this case have the objective of protecting the 
right of the workers in order for them to protect their work environment from 
possible social dumping. Such an objective may, with reference to the Court’s case 
law, constitute an overriding reason of public interest.  
 
The Court concluded the following: 
 
Para 110: 
 
“However, collective action such as that at issue in the main proceedings 
cannot be justified in the light of the public interest objective referred to in 
paragraph 102 of the present judgment, where the negotiations on pay, which 
that action seeks to require an undertaking established in another Member 
State to enter into, form part of a national context characterised by a lack of 
provisions, of any kind, which are sufficiently precise and accessible that they 
do not render it impossible or excessively difficult in practice for such an 
undertaking to determine the obligations with which it is required to comply as 
regards minimum pay (see, to that effect, Arblade and Others, paragraph 
43).”209  
 
Consequently, such actions, as governed by lex Britannia, were considered precluded 
by the fundamental freedoms and the Directive mentioned earlier. Although the Court 
does not explicitly mention the principle of legal certainty as such they refer to the 
requirement that the rules must be sufficiently precise, a wording, which can be 
recognised in a context of notion, guarded by the principle of legal certainty.210 
 
                                                      
208 Case C-341/05 Laval, para 99. 
209 Case C-341/05 Laval, para 110. 
210 Case C-341/05 Laval, para 110 of the case, see also the section above, regarding the notion of legal certainty. 
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5.4 Some Conslusions on Legal Certainty 
The principle of legal certainty may in many ways be said to constitute a general 
principle of EU law. The most valid argument for making that conclusion is perhaps 
the close relationship between the principle of legal certainty and the rule of law. Legal 
certainty and proportionality may be said to have a few procedural similarities, they are 
however, of different character as regards their roles within the different legal systems, 
and above all within the European Union legal order.  However, legal certainty may 
also be alleged of being flexible and hence to take part in the legal system in different 
ways, similar to the principle of proportionality. Evidentially, one could come to the 
conclusion that legal certainty is to be regard as a general principle of EU law. 
Nonetheless, or perhaps thanks to, its flexibility which allows for a diverse scope of 
utilisation, it may be concluded that legal certainty forms part of the proportionality 
assessment. However, in comparison to the other procedural requirements mentioned 
earlier, the role of legal certainty is, as an additional requirement, perhaps not as given, 
as one would first believe. The reason being that legal certainty entails more than just 
a requirement within the principle of proportionality. I am convinced that legal 
certainty stands out from the other procedural requirements with regard to its broad 
scope of application and because of its close relationship with the rule of law.  It must 
be a general condition imposed on an entire legal system built on the premise of the 
rule of law. However, in the light of the general case law, legal certainty has become a 
premise for proportionality. This arguably supports the idea of classifying the principle 
of legal certainty as a general principle of law alongside with the principle of 
proportionality and the rule of law.  
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6 Developing the 
Proportionality Assessment  
6.1 Recent Case Law – Direct Taxation  
6.1.1 The SIAT-case 
The SIAT211 case concerned Belgian tax provisions which disallowed payments for 
services, which were rendered directly or indirectly to a foreign establishment, which 
was either not subject to income tax [at all] or was subject to a notably more 
advantageous tax regime in its home State rather than the tax regime within Belgian 
territory. If however, the taxpayer could prove, by all juridical means, that the 
payments correspond to real and sincere transactions and that those transactions were 
concluded at arm’s length terms, the deductibility of such payments would then be 
allowed for the purpose of Belgian income taxation.212  
 
During 1991 the Belgian company SIAT entered into a joint venture with the Nigerian 
company PINL. PINL was owned by a holding company established in Luxembourg 
called MISA. Later on the joint venture between the two companies dissolved as there 
was a dispute regarding the amount of commission which SIAT had to transfer to 
MISA. SIAT entered the service payments to MISA as business expenses but was 
refused deduction on the grounds of Belgian domestic law. The reason for this being 
that MISA, the receiving company, was established in a jurisdiction falling into the 
category of low-tax-jurisdiction under the Belgian law, as mentioned above. As SIAT 
was rejected the deduction, they brought proceedings before the Belgian court who 
decided to stay the proceedings and refer a question to the ECJ for a preliminary 
ruling on the compatibility of the Belgian law with the fundamental freedoms.213  
 
The questioned domestic measure constituted an exception to the general rule found 
in art 49 of 1992 Income Tax Code, which said that expenditure is to be regarded as 
deductible business expenses if it is necessary for acquiring or retaining taxable 
income and if the taxpayer demonstrates the authenticity and amount of that 
expenditure. The exception laid down in art 54 of the same Income Tax Code 
excluded business expenses relating to services provided by an entity established in 
another Member State but, which, was subject to none or very low income tax.214 
 
The Court followed its methodology as discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, as it 
started of with the question of whether the domestic measures constituted a 
restriction on the free movement of services. In consistency with previous case law 
the Court referred to the restriction as a domestic measure, which prohibit, impede or 
render less attractive the exercise of that freedom.215 
 
The burden of proof rests with the taxpayer both when the general rule and the 
specific rule are applicable. However, the specific rule stipulates a presumption that is 
harder to breach than that of the general rule. Accordingly, the Court concludes that 
                                                      
211 Case C-318/10 SIAT. 
212 European Taxation January  2012-01. 
213 Case C-318/10 SIAT, para 8-14. 
214 Case C-318/10 SIAT, para 15-17. 
215 Case C-318/10 SIAT, para 18. 
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the special rule in article 54 of the Income Tax Code of 1992, “[…]is liable to both 
dissuade Belgian taxpayers from exercising their right to the freedom to provide services and from 
making use of the services of providers established in another Member State and dissuade those 
providers from offering their services to the recipients established in Belgium.”216 
 
Moving onto the justification process the Court reiterates the settled-case law that a 
restriction may be justified if it “pursues a legitimate objective compatible with the [EC now 
TFEU] Treaty and is justified by overriding reasons relating to the public interest, in which case it 
must be suitable for securing the attainment of that objective and must not go beyond what is necessary 
in order to do so”.217  
 
The Belgian government argued that the domestic measures in question where 
justified on the basis of the need to combat tax avoidance and evasion, the need to 
preserve the balanced allocation between Member States of the power to impose 
taxes, and, which was added by supportive governments, the need to ensure the 
effectiveness of fiscal supervision.218 These grounds of justification were all dealt with 
by the Court in an argumentation underbuilt by a valid reasoning and the Court came 
to the conclusion that the legislation in question could be justified on the two latter 
grounds, under the presumption that the measures also fulfilled the proportionality 
test.219 However, when discussing the question of proportionality the Court does so in 
the light of the first ground of justification. With this being said it possible to stipulate 
that the Court does not always discuss each ground of justification on its own, rather 
that it merely makes a summary assessment collectively.220  
 
 
6.1.2 The ITELCAR-case  
In the ITELCAR221 case the Court was asked to give a preliminary ruling on the 
compatibility of Portuguese domestic tax measures relating to thin capitalisation rules. 
According to the domestic measures, interest in excessive debt paid to an associated 
entity, not established within the Union, was not a deductible expense for the purpose 
of determining the taxable profit. However, such interest would have been considered 
a deductible expense for the purpose of determining the taxable profit if the 
associated entity had been established in Portugal. Hence, the distinguishing factor 
was that of place of establishment. The factual circumstances in this case are not 
relevant for the purpose of this thesis, but rather the characteristics of the domestic 
measures and the judgment of the Court.  
 
In its judgment the Court follows the methodology discussed in the chapter above 
and starts off with the applicable freedom and reiterates the judgment of Fidium 
Finanz and the following case law222 thereof.223 The Court then comes to the 
conclusion that the fact that a resident company contracting its overall debts in excess 
with a company established in a non-Member State is subject to a less favourable tax 
                                                      
216 Case C-318/10 SIAT, para 28. 
217 Case C-318/10 SIAT, para 34. 
218 Case C-318/10 SIAT, para 36. 
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treatment than a resident company contracting such debts with a company resident in 
the same, or in another Member State. Hence, the Court concludes that the measures 
in question are liable to deter a resident company from entering into a credit 
arrangement with excessive debt with a company established in a non-Member State; 
hence, the domestic measure constitutes a restriction on the free movement of 
capital.224  
 
The Court goes on to state that it is settled case law that a measure constituting a 
restriction, may be justified by an overriding reason in the public interest, if it is 
appropriate for ensuring the objective attained, and if it does not go beyond what is 
necessary.225  
 
Clearly it may be argued that the Court is expressing the fact that the principle of 
proportionality should be consulted when determining if the restriction may be 
justified. As far as this is concerned, it is settled case law of the Court and as we have 
seen above it is part of the methodology of the Court, nonetheless, sometimes 
expressed differently.   
 
As the Portuguese government has, in case where the Courts decision results in a 
restriction, based its argumentation for justification on the argument that the domestic 
measures in question have been adopted in order to combat tax evasion and 
avoidance. The ground for justification finds its source in the domestic measures as it 
is applicable in a way that it prohibits thin capitalisation, which consist in eroding the 
Portuguese tax base. However, the Court has only accepted this ground for 
justification when the questioned legislation specifically targets wholly artificial 
arrangements.226 The domestic measures in question target situations where an 
excessive debt is paid to a company not residing within the Union, whereas such 
legislation is not applicable on a situation where the receiving company was to be 
residing within the Union. Consequently, the Portuguese thin capitalisation rules only 
apply in cross-border situations, making the distinction based on the place of 
residency of the receiving company. The Court concludes that the measures are 
indeed possible to justify on the basis of the ground for justification as chosen by the 
Portuguese government, hence they meet the requirement of appropriateness; 
however, they move on to review the necessity of such measures. When determining 
the necessity the Court states that domestic measures targeting wholly artificial 
arrangements may be the necessary mean if “[…O] n each occasion on which the 
existence of such arrangement cannot be ruled out, those rules gives the tax payer an 
opportunity, without subjecting him to undue administrative constraints, to provide 
evidence on any commercial justification that there may have been for that 
transaction.”227 Consequently, the Court admits that as the domestic measures in 
question give that possibility to the taxpayer, they should be regarded as necessary in 
order to attain their objective. Nevertheless, the Court concludes that such measures 
are not proportionate.228  
 
Before the judgment in the SIAT-case it was possible to believe that the Court would 
have stopped here and concluded the rules were not compatible with the free 
                                                      
224 Case C-282/12 ITELCAR, para 30-31. 
225 Case C-282/12 ITELCAR, para 32 and para 36, see also the section on the fundamental freedoms above as the 
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further case law on this matter; Case C-182/08 Glaxo Wellcome, Case C-524/04 Thin Cap Group Litigation, and the Case 
C-255/02 Halifax, which concerned indirect taxation but nonetheless early addressed the question of wholly artificial 
arrangements.  
227 Case C-282/14 ITELCAR, para 38. 
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movement of capital. However, for some reason the Court adds an additional 
requirement after, or as a part of, the justification process, namely that of legal 
certainty of the rules, and refers to its judgement in the SIAT-case as mentioned 
above.  
 
Para 44: 
 
“That being so, the rules in question do not make it possible, at the outset, to 
determine their scope with sufficient precision. Accordingly, they do not meet 
the requirement of legal certainty, in accordance with which rules of law must 
be clear, précises and predictable as regards their effects, especially where they 
may have unfavourable consequences for individuals and companies. As it is, 
rules which do not meet the requirement of the principle of legal certainty 
cannot be considered to be proportionate to the objectives pursued.”229 
 
 
Consequently, the Court makes the presumption that legal certainty is a requirement for 
the fulfilment of the principle of proportionality expressed in the proportionality 
assessment.  
 
 
6.1.3 Is the Outcome Circumstantial? 
One question that could be posed in this context is whether the outcome, and the 
reference to legal certainty as another requirement for proportionality, is 
circumstantial? Moreover, there are a few circumstances, or factors that need to be 
discussed in this section, in relation to the cases describe in the section above.  
 
 
6.1.3.1 Characteristics of the Domestic Measures 
The domestic measures challenged in the SIAT-case had the objective of hindering 
practices resulting in tax avoidance. The special rule in the SIAT-case was applicable 
in two situations, either when the payment was made from a Belgian tax payer to a 
non-Belgian recipient in another Member State, which was subject to a more 
advantageous tax regime, or when the recipient was not subject to any income 
taxation. The issue in the Belgian legislation concerned the wording of the measures as 
they stipulated “a tax regime which is appreciably more advantageous than the 
applicable regime in Belgium”. As there were no administrative instructions on how to 
interpret the wording of the rules, the question of the applicability of the rules would 
have to be determined on a pure case-by-case basis. Also the fact that the rules could 
be applied, in case the taxpayer could not provide sufficient evidence verified by a 
third party, adhered to the situation. As we have seen the Court concluded, within the 
proportionality assessment, that the scope of the special rule could not possibly be 
determined with sufficient precision and therefore its applicability remained a matter 
of uncertainty.  
 
The measures in question in the ITELCAR-case concerned the right to deduct 
excessive interest, when the lender had a special relationship with the recipient of the 
loan, not implying a shareholding relation. It was the wording of these thin 
capitalisation rules that ended up being the key point in the case. Therefore, just as in 
the SIAT-case, the Court focused on the justification process and on the wording of 
                                                      
229 Case C-282/12 ITELCAR, para 44. 
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the legislation. The “special relations” concept established a presumption that when a 
lender, residing in what is referred to as third territory, entered into a loan agreement 
with a Portuguese taxpayer, that, according to the Portuguese law in question, 
constituted a special relation which formed part of a design to avoid taxation. The 
presumption of the intention of the “special relation” did thus, not fulfil the test 
established by the principle of proportionality.  
 
Even though the different domestic measures of these cases did not concern the same 
type of situations, they had at least one thing in common; they where far too 
ambiguous and general in their wording.  
 
 
6.1.3.2 Comments in the Literature 
Hilling230 argues that the requirement of legal certainty as an additional step within the 
proportionality assessment may be explained with reference to what she refers to as 
“the proceduralization of proportionality”. The proceduralization of proportionality 
relates to the situation where the Court has added additional requirements, besides the 
substantive test, in order for rules to be considered proportional, where legal certainty 
and transparency are examples of such requirements. The proceduralization of the 
principle of proportionality may also be referred to in situations where the Court has 
put the principles of good governance forth as an additional obligation for the 
Member States to fulfil in order to pass the test of the principle of proportionality. 
Hilling refers to this within her article discussing whether it is possible to design EU-
compatible tax avoidance rules. With regard to this article, in can be concluded that 
general tax avoidance rules may have an additional requirement imposed on them.  
 
Peters provides us with arguments not related to whether the principle of legal 
certainty is an additional requirement within the justification process, instead his 
analysis on the matter concerns the attitude of the Court towards why they did not 
accept the domestic measures in the SIAT case. He argues that the Court did not 
declare the rules incompatible with the fundamental freedoms on the basis of the usage 
of the vague term in the rules in question.231 Remember the exception to the general 
rule was worded: 
  “[…] subject to a tax regime which is appreciable more advantageous than 
the applicable regime in Belgium.”232  
 
Instead Peters is convinced that it was the lack of a statutory definition or 
administrative instruction on how to understand the wording that the Court based its 
judgment on. Hence also the reason why the domestic measures did not fulfil the 
principle of legal certainty.233  
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6.2 The Aftermath in Case Law 
Concerning Direct Taxation 
This section will touch upon the case law delivered between the SIAT and the Itelcar-
cases, concerning measures related to direct taxation and the fundamental freedoms. 
The case law will be discussed in chronological order. Cases related to individual 
taxation have been left outside the scope of this section. 
 
 
6.2.1 After SIAT, Before ITELCAR 
 
In Commission v. Spain234 the issue concerned exit tax provisions and their compatibility 
with, inter alia, the fundamental freedoms. In its findings the Court referred to 
previous case law235 on the matter and concluded that the domestic measures in 
question constituted a restriction against the fundamental freedoms.236 The Court 
concludes that, after discussing the different justification grounds on which Spain 
supported their position, although it does not accept the justification grounds, 
nonetheless, the rules cannot be considered to be proportionate as they go beyond 
what is necessary for attaining the objectives.237 Hence, no question of legal certainty 
was raised; however, it is perhaps no surprise as the Court did not accept the grounds 
of justification on which Spain claimed their case. Nevertheless, it is interesting that 
the Court, however, mentioned the question of proportionality when it had already 
dismissed the justification grounds.  
 
Commission v. Portugal238 also concerned the question of exit taxation. The Court 
concluded, with reference to National Grid Indus239, that the fundamental freedom in 
question “[…]precludes domestic measures which prescribe the immediate recovery of tax on 
unrealised capital gains relating to assets of a company transferring its place of effective management to 
another Member State at the very time of the transfer.“240 No further question regarding 
justification and proportionality was raised. 
 
The Philips Electronics241 case concerned legislation which hindered the transfer of 
losses incurred by a non-resident branch of an establishment located in another 
Member State. The Court discussed the previous case law242 on the matter, and 
concluded that the domestic measures in question constituted a restriction on the 
freedom of establishment, in this case regarding the right to a secondary 
establishment, such as a non-resident branch.243 The Court reiterates that in order for 
such a restriction to be justified it needs to pursue an overriding reason in the public 
interest, further that it needs to be appropriate to ensure that objective and that it does 
not go beyond what is necessary.244 The Court then reaches the conclusion that the 
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rules cannot be justified with reference to the objective of preventing a double use of 
losses and/or the objective of preserving a balanced allocation of the power to impose 
taxes between member States. Hence, the question of proportionality was never 
discussed as the Court dismissed the justification grounds put forth by the UK.245  
 
In the DIVI246case the question concerned wealth tax. DAVD, the establishment 
incorporated in Luxembourg, transferred its seat from Luxembourg to Italy and was 
no longer able to benefit from the capital tax reduction imposed by Luxembourgish 
law. The Court concluded that the domestic measures in question were liable to deter 
establishments incorporated in Luxembourg to transfer its seat to another Member 
State.247 With regard to the question of whether the measure in question could be 
justified the Court held the same as it did in Commission v Portugal with reference to 
National Grid Indus mentioned above.248 Likewise, as was held in the Commission v. 
Portugal and Philips Electronics cases the Court concluded that the rules could not be 
justified on the basis of the justification grounds provided by Luxembourg.249 Hence, 
the proportionality assessment was not made.  
 
In Commission v. Belgium250 the disputed domestic measures entailed a different 
treatment between investment corporations established in Belgium and non-resident 
branches not established in Belgium. Those rules were not justified on the basis of the 
grounds put forth by the Belgian Government. The question of proportionality was 
thus not assessed within the justification process, it was however, mentioned similarly 
to the cases mentioned above.251 The same result can be seen in Commission v. 
Finland252, which concerned rules differentiating between dividends paid to domestic 
pension funds and non-resident pension funds.253 In Test Claimants in the FII Group 
Litigation II254, also referred to as FII(2), the Court concluded that the legislation in 
question constituted a restriction on the fundamental freedoms.255 The rules in 
question imposed for the credit method to be used in cases of foreign-sourced 
dividends, whilst the exemption method applied in relation to domestically-sourced 
dividends. The Court accepted the differentiation on the basis of the justification 
ground of the need to preserve the cohesion of the tax system, however, it did not 
find the domestic measure in question necessary in order to preserve the cohesion of 
the tax system. Nor did it find the domestic measures necessary in relation to its 
objectives, namely to avoid a double taxation.256 This argumentation seems to have 
been turned around as opposed to the commonly known methodology of the Court. 
 
In the Commission v. Belgium257  case, the Commission initiated infringement 
proceedings against Belgium due to the fact that the Belgian legislation allowed a tax 
reduction on pension payments solely when the financial institution to which the 
depositions where made resided within Belgian territory. Consequently, the Court 
concluded that the measures in question constituted a restriction and moved onto the 
question of whether it can be justified with reference to imperative reasons.258 
Nevertheless, the Court concluded, inter alia, that the justification grounds relied on, 
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namely the need to prevent tax avoidance and evasion in the context of guaranteeing 
the effectiveness of fiscal supervision cannot be used in order to justify the measures 
since the Belgian government could have adopted less restrictive measures.259 
 
In Argenta Spaarbank260 the Court ruled on the compatibility of Belgian tax rules, 
which offered a tax benefit where risk capital was invested in permanent 
establishments located in Belgium whereas such a benefit was not grated when the 
investment was put into a permanent establishment located in another Member State. 
The advantage was in the form of a deduction of the risk capital from the basis of 
assessment for corporate income taxation. This case has been largely criticised by 
Wattel261 as regards, inter alia, the comparability analysis performed by the Court.262 
Moreover the Court continues with its methodology and reiterates that in order for 
the measures to be justified they need to pursue an overriding interest in the public 
interest and nonetheless, constitute an appropriate measure in order to ensure the 
attainment of the objective in question. Further it shall not go beyond what is 
necessary to attain that objective.263 The Court does not reach the proportionality 
assessment within the justification process before reaching the finish line. It concludes 
that the measures cannot be justified with relation to the justification grounds on 
which Belgium based its defence.264  
 
 
6.2.2 After SIAT and ITELCAR 
The third case in the series concerning the Text Claimants in the FII Group Litigation has 
been mentioned above but shall be recalled in this section as is qualifies as case law to 
be mentioned in this chapter as it was delivered after both the Itelcar case and the 
SIAT-case. The case concerned the remedies available for sums paid but not due. 
Legal certainty was mentioned in the case, although the questions did not concern the 
compatibility of the English legislation with the fundamental freedoms, hence legal 
certainty was not mentioned in the context as an additional requirement within the 
proportionality assessment.  
 
 
6.2.3 Summary  
Interestingly, none of the case law concerning direct taxation, in between the two 
judgments mentioned legal certainty as an additional criterion within the 
proportionality assessment. The obvious reason perhaps being that the Court did not 
reach the question of proportionality before concluding that the measures where not 
justifiable. Also perhaps because none of the case law concerns domestic measures 
containing the characteristics that the domestic measures in the SIAT and the 
ITELCAR cases did. In this regard it is however possible to conclude that the Court 
have used the principle of legal certainty as a premise for proportionality now also 
with regard to domestic measures belonging to the field of direct taxation.  
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7 Summary and Conclusions 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter is the beginning and the end of the last section of this thesis. Initially I 
asked you to keep a few issues in mind while reading this thesis. We shall remember 
those issues here together with the legal questions posed under “purpose” in chapter 
one. 
 
The legal questions posed earlier: 
 
Has legal certainty become an additional step of assessment within the principle of proportionality 
applied with regard to the fundamental freedoms? 
 
Does the requirement of a rule to fulfil the principle of legal certainty appear in certain situations or 
may it be applied on all domestic measures relating to direct taxation? 
 
 
7.2 Summarising Conclusions 
 
Propor t iona l i t y  a  mul t i fa c e t ed  g enera l  pr inc ip l e  o f  law  
 
Most general principles of law stem from the different constitutional orders of the 
different Member States. They form part of a separate source of law, which can be 
said to form part of the primary law of the Union together with the Treaties. Their 
existence is probably not debatable but how and why they come to existence is 
undoubtedly a more intriguing concern. The principle of proportionality forms part of 
that source and, just as general principles of law, it has the characteristic of being 
extremely veritable, flexible and perhaps vague. It is not hard to form the opinion that 
the principle of proportionality constitutes a general principle of law, judge-made or 
not, it is still a general principle of law. However, concluding that the principle of 
proportionality qualifies, as a general principle of EU law may perhaps not answer all 
the questions initially posed.  
  
The principle of proportionality can be said to entail a core often referred to as the 
substantive part of the principle. Occasionally even the principle itself is referred to as 
being a substantive principle. However, the substantive part of the principle may be 
described as a tool containing a balancing act, firstly, between the measures imposed 
an the objectives they pursue, often expressed in terms of appropriateness or suitability 
(the balancing of the relationship between the measures undertaken and the objectives 
that those measures pursue). Secondly, between the conflicting interests (the 
relationship between the conflicting interests). The procedure of applying the principle 
of proportionality can therefore be concluded as the search for the perfect 
equilibrium. Occasionally the proportionality assessment is accused of having three 
steps as inspired by the German perception on the principle of proportionality. 
Instead, the application of the principle itself should be seen as a balancing act and in 
my opinion balancing issues that have already been balanced will perhaps only 
increase the formalistic view of the principle of proportionality. The reason for the 
diverse perception is perhaps the vague definition of proportionality itself. van Gerven 
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upholds this thought as well as he contemplates that perhaps the Court itself is not as 
familiar with the exact content of the principle of proportionality used within the 
proportionality assessment. Perhaps it is time to get straight about proportionality, 
especially with the growing importance of that principle in an increasing global 
context. The growing importance can partly be blamed on the mounting importance 
and perception of human rights, fundamental rights and economic rights. 
 
The proceduralization of the principle of proportionality is an intriguing issue. The 
perceptions on whether the procedural requirements occasionally imposed on the 
domestic measures shall be seen as forming part of the principle of proportionality are 
shattered. Perchal does not want us to force, the already burdened principle, with 
additional requirements. Based on the same line of arguing de Vries contemplates that 
the proceduralization may be an alternative to the balancing act that the substantive 
part of the principle of proportionality boils down to. In their view procedural 
requirements attached to the principle of proportionality constitutes a forced concept. 
In my opinion the procedural requirements should be viewed as forming part of (at 
least) the second test mentioned above (necessity). When the court determines 
whether less restrictive means could have been implemented instead it searches for the 
flaws of the domestic measures accused of constituting an obstacle to the fundamental 
freedoms. Where else but not there, could the Court conclude that the domestic 
measures in question do not fulfil certain procedural requirements? Let us use an 
example, the SIAT case. The domestic measures in question where considered 
disproportionate as they included a terminology which was vague and lacked a 
statutory definition. Concluding that it was not the rules themselves that did not fulfil 
the principle of legal certainty is was the lack of a statutory definition that did not fulfil 
that requirement. Implying that the principle of legal certainty is not an additional 
procedural requirement, rather it is a requirement for the legal system in general to 
fulfil. In this regard it must be stressed that the Court has made proportionality 
dependent on legal certainty. However, the concerns to be raised in this regard are 
perhaps what effects this might have on the content of the principle of 
proportionality. What does proportionality really entail then and what role does it 
really pursue in the context of the European legal order. Where is the legal certainty in 
the principle of proportionality itself, or may we perhaps not impose that requirement 
on another general principle of law per se. This argumentation would the constitute of 
circles and perhaps grasping the content of the principle of proportionality is a harder 
task than first believed.  
 
 
The obso l e t e  Gebhard t e s t  and the  in cr eas ing  impor tance  o f  the  g rounds  o f  
jus t i f i ca t ion  
 
The Court made a statement with the Gebhard case when it addressed the issues 
concerning the methodology used by the Court. The Gebhard case provided us with a 
guide on how to determine whether domestic measures may be justified or not 
according to the rule of reason doctrine. According to the Gebhard test the domestic 
measures in question had to fulfil four criteria in order to be justified. In the view of 
the change in approach of the Court it could arguably be concluded that the two first 
steps of the Gebhard case are somewhat obsolete.  
 
Firstly, it could be argued that the Court is moving towards a greater acceptance of the 
restriction approach on the benefit of the discriminations approach. Without 
discussing the meaning of the different terminology it may still be concluded that 
restriction is a larger term encompassing the idea of the restrictions approach. With 
that being said, the discriminations approach is still alive and kicking it is just not the 
focus of the Court when assessing the compatibility of domestic measures with the 
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fundamental freedoms. Indeed there is the question of the comparable situation and 
whether it is necessary or not, it shall unfortunately not be discussed further in this 
thesis. Nevertheless, the acceptance of the restrictions approach allows us to draw the 
conclusion that more domestic measure qualifies as restrictions to the free movement 
under this approach, and so the real assessment is tilted over on the justification 
process, which I shall soon get to. Based on the premise that the restrictions approach 
is increasingly accepted, the tilt may be viewed as a necessary effect of accepting the 
restrictions approach. In this regard a reference to the case law previously presented 
should be made. It can be deduced from that case law that more and more so is the 
Court focused on whether the objectives that the domestic measures in question 
pursue, can be said to qualify as an imperative interest in the public interest. In the 
case law delivered between the SIAT case and the ITELCAR case it is obviously so 
that the Court often reaches the question of whether the measures in question are 
justifiable in relation to the objectives they pursue. It is rather seldom that the Court 
moves on to the proportionality assessment as it did in the SIAT case and the 
ITELCAR case.265  
 
Consequently, in my opinion the proportionality assessment should just be referred to 
as the application of the principle of proportionality because that is in my view what it 
consists of. Hence, the proportionality assessment is tantamount to the application of 
the substantive part of the principle.  
 
 
A change  o f  fo cus   
 
As has been held previously, there has been a change in the methodology of the 
Court. If one was to compare the early case law on the free movement in general, with 
the recently delivered case law, one may come to the conclusion that the importance 
of the assessment has shifted. In the present we can distinguish a tendency in the case 
law, were an increasing number of measures are considered to constitute obstacles to 
the free movement in question. Where as instead the emphasis and the importance of 
the assessment lies within the question of proportionality. A possible explanation is 
the broad scope of application through the restriction based approach rather than 
solely the discrimination approach. 
 
The argument that there is a change in tendency by the focus of the Court is 
supported by the doctrinal debate, and with reference to the case law presented it can 
be concluded that there is a broad perception that the focus of the Court is now days, 
mainly on the justification process and the proportionality assessment therein.266 That 
being said it does not necessarily mean that measures are more often considered 
compatible or the opposite. In fact as we have seen just with reference to the case law 
delivered by the Court after the SIAT case but before the ITELCAR case, there are 
few cases where the Court even have to assess whether the measures in question are 
proportionate.  
 
 
Lega l  c e r ta in ty  as  a  new requir ement  fo r  propor t iona l i t y   
 
Firstly, legal certainty is, as has also been held with regard to the principle of 
proportionality, a general principle of [EU] law, or at least it may be classified as such 
a principle. Both these principles impose obligations on the legislation, which must be 
fulfilled in order for the principles to be satisfied. The principle of proportionality 
                                                      
265 See especially section 7.2.1 in this regard. 
266 See sections above and references cited therein. 
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imposes the obligation that actions undertaken must be appropriate, necessary and not 
be disproportionate. Previously expressed in the two test presented by Tridimas. 
Proportionality may even be more abstractly expressed in the phrase: actions 
undertaken must be in proportion to their objectives.  
 
Legal certainty on the other hand, may be explained with reference to the case law 
above, as imposing the obligation on the Member States’ legislation, to be clear, 
precise and predicable in relation to its effects. This is especially wanted for in the field 
of economical law such as tax law. The persons within the Union must be able to 
foresee the effects of the legislation. Formerly the content of legal certainty has been 
discussed and I believe it is relevant in this regard to remember what Peters argued in 
his article. He stipulated that legal certainty does not require for domestic measures to 
be stiff and detailed, he raised the importance of the flexibility of the different 
legislation within the different Member States, and he concluded that the key to fulfil 
the principle of legal certainty is to find the equilibrium between precision and 
flexibility. The requirements that the principle of legal certainty imposes on the 
legislation of the Member States are foremost that the rules must be sufficiently 
precise in order to understand the outcome of the application of them. The principle 
of legal certainty also comes to expression through the corollary of legitimate 
expectations and it also has a close relationship with the idea of foreseeability. My 
concerns regarding fitting legal certainty into the proportionality assessment have been 
discussed above, and consequently, even though the principle of legal certainty may be 
viewed as an additional requirement for proportionality, it does not necessarily have to 
be given that role. The principle of legal certainty should be a cornerstone of each 
legal system built on the premise of the rule of law. Nevertheless, the Court has 
evidentially concluded that fulfilling the principle of legal certainty may constitute a 
requirement for fulfilling the principle of proportionality expressed in the 
proportionality assessment; therefore it is not inconceivable that this premise 
constitutes a true and valid argument.  
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